

# Online Appendix:

## “Twice the Citizen”: How Military Attitudes of Superiority Undermine Civilian Control in the United States

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# 1 TISS 1998-99

## 1.1 Military Superiority

We use the following three questions to measure military superiority:

1. **Adopt:** “Civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military’s values and customs.” (Q08D)
2. **Example:** “Through leading by example, the military could help American society become more moral.” (Q08B)
3. **Sacrifice:** “All Americans should be willing to give up their lives to defend our country.” (Q08F)

These three questions are significantly correlated with each other:

Table 1: Correlation Coefficients, Military Superiority

	adopt	example
adopt		
example	0.45****	
sacrifice	0.28****	0.16****

In addition to using each measure individually, we therefore also average them into one composite variable *superiority*.

## 1.2 Confidence in Civilians

We likewise use three questions to measure confidence in civilian leaders:

1. **Veteran Pres:** “To be respected as Commander-in-Chief, the President should have served in uniform.” (Q48E)
2. **Partisan:** “When civilians tell the military what to do, domestic partisan politics rather than national security requirements are often the primary motivation.” (Q48C)

3. **Ignorant:** “How knowledgeable do you think our political leaders are about the modern military?” (Q24, reverse coded so 4=very ignorant)

The three questions significantly correlate, so we again combine them into one variable *confidence* in addition to presenting them individually. We reverse-code each variable when averaging them into *confidence*.

Table 2: Correlation Coefficients, Confidence in Civilian Leaders

	vet pres	partisan
vet pres		
partisan	0.27****	
know	0.12****	0.16****

### 1.3 Civilian Control

We then measure each component of civilian control:

1. **Constrain.** Average of four questions:

- “Members of the military should not publicly criticize senior member of the civilian branch of the government.” (Q47A, reverse coded so strongly disagree=4)
- “It is proper for the military to advocate publicly the military policies it believes are in the best interests of the United States.” (Q47E)
- “If a senior civilian DOD leader asks a military officer to do something that the military officer believes is *unwise*, would it be appropriate for the officer to” (Q44)
  - Retire or leave the service in protest (1=Appropriate)
  - Leak the matter to the press to alert others to this problem (1=Appropriate)

These four generally correlate, so we combine them into one variable, *constrain*:

Table 3: Correlation Coefficients, Constrain

	critic	advocate	retire
critic			
advocate	0.07***		
retire	0.03	0.00	
leak	0.10****	0.04*	0.15****

2. **Contest.** Average of four questions:

- Please specify the proper role of the military for each element (*for each: 1=Insist, 0 otherwise*)
  - “Deciding whether to intervene.” (Q46A)
  - “Ensuring that clear political and military goals exist.” (Q46C)
  - “Deciding what the goals or policy should be.” (Q46D)
  - “Developing an exit strategy” (Q46F)

These four significantly correlate, so we combine them into one variable, *contest*:

Table 4: Correlation Coefficients, Contest

	intervene	clear	goals
intervene			
clear	0.11****		
goals	0.24****	0.16****	
exit	0.13****	0.40****	0.16****

3. **Limit.** Average of four questions:

- “In wartime, civilian government leaders should let the military take over running the war.” (Q48D)
- “In general, high ranking civilian officials rather than high ranking military officers should have the final say on whether or not to use military force.” (Q48A, reverse coded so strongly disagree=4)

- “In general, high ranking civilian officials rather than high ranking military officers should have the final say on what type of military force to use.” (Q48B, reverse coded so strongly disagree=4)
- “Military leaders do not have enough influence in deciding our policy with other countries.” (Q48G).

These four also correlate, so we combine them into one variable, *limit*:

Table 5: Correlation Coefficients, Limit

	runwar	whetfor	typefor
runwar			
whetfor	0.12****		
typefor	0.13****	0.26****	
foreign pol	0.20****	0.24****	0.09****

## 1.4 Regressions

Table 6 presents the regressions from which Figures 3 and 4 (in text) were created. They show the correlation between the composite superiority variable on confidence in civilian leaders (model 1), constraining civilian authority (model 2), contesting civilian authority (model 3), and limiting civilian authority (model 4).

Table 7 then breaks up the confidence variable into its component parts, showing that superiority likewise correlates with each component: wanting the president to be a veteran (model 1), thinking civilians are partisan (model 2), and thinking civilians are ignorant (model 3).

Tables 8-10 show that all results hold when breaking up the superiority variable into its component parts, namely, that society should adopt military values (Table 8), that the military should lead by example (Table 9), and that all Americans should sacrifice (Table 10). Finally, Table 11 shows that results hold when subsetting to non-Republicans (Democrats and Independents).

Table 6: Military Superiority, Confidence in Civilians, and Civilian Control (TISS 1999)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Confidence (1)	Constrain (2)	Contest (3)	Limit (4)
Superiority	-0.205*** (0.021)	0.046** (0.020)	0.157*** (0.035)	0.163*** (0.020)
<u>Covariates</u>				
Female	-0.054 (0.041)	0.060 (0.039)	-0.143** (0.067)	0.166*** (0.040)
Age	-0.025** (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	0.014 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.011)
Education	0.070*** (0.020)	-0.036* (0.020)	0.021 (0.035)	-0.106*** (0.021)
Republican	-0.105*** (0.027)	-0.010 (0.027)	0.040 (0.046)	0.019 (0.027)
White	-0.047 (0.039)	-0.036 (0.039)	0.040 (0.066)	-0.018 (0.038)
Pray	0.023** (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.010)
Evangelical	-0.029 (0.039)	-0.060 (0.039)	-0.018 (0.066)	-0.038 (0.039)
South	0.049 (0.033)	0.067** (0.033)	-0.060 (0.056)	-0.002 (0.033)
Army	-0.016 (0.039)	-0.038 (0.038)	-0.126* (0.068)	-0.015 (0.039)
Rank	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.006 (0.007)	0.002 (0.004)
Deployed	-0.042 (0.031)	-0.057* (0.031)	0.040 (0.055)	-0.043 (0.031)
Mil Family	0.010 (0.027)	-0.014 (0.027)	0.081* (0.046)	-0.040 (0.027)
Mil Friends	-0.032** (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)	0.080*** (0.022)	0.014 (0.013)
Constant	3.268*** (0.194)	2.128*** (0.194)	0.235 (0.338)	2.347*** (0.199)
Observations	1,852	1,918	2,088	1,803
R <sup>2</sup>	0.118	0.017	0.029	0.111
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.111	0.010	0.023	0.104

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Correlation between Military Superiority and Confidence in Civilians (TISS 1999)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Veteran Pres	Civilians-Partisan	Civilians-Ignorant	Confidence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Superiority	0.359*** (0.033)	0.137*** (0.029)	0.109*** (0.025)	-0.205*** (0.021)
<u>Covariates</u>				
Female	0.086 (0.064)	0.066 (0.058)	-0.044 (0.050)	-0.054 (0.041)
Age	0.040** (0.017)	0.027* (0.015)	0.004 (0.013)	-0.025** (0.010)
Education	-0.157*** (0.033)	-0.082*** (0.029)	0.045* (0.026)	0.070*** (0.020)
Army	0.237*** (0.043)	0.047 (0.038)	0.026 (0.034)	-0.105*** (0.027)
Rank	0.065 (0.063)	0.006 (0.056)	0.103** (0.049)	-0.047 (0.039)
Deployed	-0.022 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023** (0.010)
Mil Family	-0.017 (0.063)	0.085 (0.056)	0.033 (0.049)	-0.029 (0.039)
Mil Friends	0.016 (0.053)	-0.066 (0.047)	-0.082** (0.041)	0.049 (0.033)
Republican	-0.018 (0.064)	0.034 (0.055)	0.056 (0.050)	-0.016 (0.039)
White	0.009 (0.006)	0.010* (0.005)	0.011** (0.005)	-0.011*** (0.004)
Pray	-0.007 (0.051)	0.013 (0.045)	0.136*** (0.040)	-0.042 (0.031)
Evangelical	0.036 (0.044)	-0.020 (0.039)	-0.038 (0.034)	0.010 (0.027)
South	0.029 (0.021)	0.003 (0.018)	0.057*** (0.016)	-0.032** (0.013)
Constant	1.362*** (0.317)	2.081*** (0.275)	1.754*** (0.249)	3.268*** (0.194)
Observations	1,976	1,908	2,121	1,852
R <sup>2</sup>	0.156	0.050	0.061	0.118
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.150	0.043	0.055	0.111

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Effect of “Society should adopt military values” on Civilian Control (TISS 1999)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Confidence (1)	Constrain (2)	Contest (3)	Limit (4)
Adopt	-0.129*** (0.015)	0.039*** (0.015)	0.068*** (0.025)	0.119*** (0.015)
<u>Covariates</u>				
Female	-0.034 (0.040)	0.052 (0.038)	-0.141** (0.066)	0.156*** (0.040)
Age	-0.022** (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	0.010 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.011)
Education	0.071*** (0.020)	-0.038* (0.020)	0.014 (0.035)	-0.109*** (0.020)
Republican	-0.111*** (0.027)	-0.017 (0.026)	0.061 (0.045)	0.019 (0.026)
White	-0.035 (0.039)	-0.028 (0.039)	0.038 (0.065)	-0.037 (0.038)
Pray	0.014 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)	0.002 (0.017)	0.002 (0.010)
Evangelical	-0.028 (0.039)	-0.063 (0.038)	-0.013 (0.066)	-0.028 (0.039)
South	0.053 (0.032)	0.071** (0.032)	-0.061 (0.056)	-0.002 (0.033)
Army	-0.006 (0.039)	-0.037 (0.038)	-0.109 (0.067)	-0.030 (0.039)
Rank	-0.010*** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.006)	0.003 (0.004)
Deployed	-0.042 (0.031)	-0.055* (0.031)	0.040 (0.054)	-0.040 (0.031)
Mil Family	0.013 (0.027)	-0.009 (0.027)	0.072 (0.046)	-0.039 (0.027)
Mil Friends	-0.034*** (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)	0.077*** (0.022)	0.016 (0.013)
Constant	2.996*** (0.187)	2.176*** (0.186)	0.578* (0.327)	2.525*** (0.193)
Observations	1,902	1,977	2,163	1,848
R <sup>2</sup>	0.103	0.019	0.020	0.106
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.096	0.012	0.014	0.099

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$



Table 9: Effect of “The military should lead by example” on Civilian Control (TISS 1999)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Confidence	Constrain	Contest	Limit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lead by Example	-0.071*** (0.015)	0.029** (0.014)	0.087*** (0.024)	0.084*** (0.014)
<u>Covariates</u>				
Female	-0.036 (0.040)	0.061 (0.038)	-0.125* (0.065)	0.166*** (0.039)
Age	-0.023** (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	0.012 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.011)
Education	0.070*** (0.020)	-0.040** (0.020)	0.022 (0.035)	-0.111*** (0.021)
Republican	-0.140*** (0.026)	0.001 (0.026)	0.062 (0.044)	0.032 (0.026)
White	-0.030 (0.039)	-0.037 (0.038)	0.021 (0.064)	-0.036 (0.038)
Pray	0.019* (0.010)	0.001 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.010)
Evangelical	-0.035 (0.039)	-0.062 (0.038)	-0.030 (0.065)	-0.029 (0.038)
South	0.038 (0.033)	0.068** (0.032)	-0.045 (0.055)	0.012 (0.032)
Army	-0.009 (0.039)	-0.046 (0.038)	-0.118* (0.067)	-0.026 (0.039)
Rank	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)	0.004 (0.004)
Deployed	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.053* (0.031)	0.050 (0.054)	-0.039 (0.031)
Mil Family	-0.001 (0.027)	0.002 (0.026)	0.079* (0.045)	-0.026 (0.027)
Mil Friends	-0.038*** (0.013)	0.007 (0.013)	0.068*** (0.021)	0.016 (0.013)
Constant	2.892*** (0.191)	2.180*** (0.188)	0.509 (0.328)	2.645*** (0.195)
Observations	1,943	2,023	2,217	1,889
R <sup>2</sup>	0.079	0.018	0.021	0.094
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.073	0.012	0.014	0.087

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Table 10: Effect of “All Americans should sacrifice” on Civilian Control (TISS 1999)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Confidence	Constrain	Contest	Limit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sacrifice	-0.116*** (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.090*** (0.024)	0.059*** (0.014)
<u>Covariates</u>				
Female	-0.067* (0.040)	0.049 (0.039)	-0.116* (0.066)	0.178*** (0.040)
Age	-0.028*** (0.010)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.014 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.011)
Education	0.075*** (0.020)	-0.041** (0.020)	0.010 (0.035)	-0.112*** (0.021)
Republican	-0.140*** (0.026)	0.001 (0.026)	0.069 (0.044)	0.052** (0.026)
White	-0.023 (0.038)	-0.036 (0.038)	0.006 (0.065)	-0.044 (0.038)
Pray	0.015 (0.010)	0.006 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.016)	0.003 (0.010)
Evangelical	-0.047 (0.039)	-0.066* (0.038)	-0.050 (0.065)	-0.032 (0.039)
South	0.032 (0.032)	0.067** (0.032)	-0.036 (0.055)	0.007 (0.033)
Army	-0.018 (0.039)	-0.045 (0.038)	-0.110* (0.067)	-0.018 (0.039)
Rank	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)	0.003 (0.004)
Deployed	-0.047 (0.031)	-0.056* (0.031)	0.056 (0.054)	-0.037 (0.031)
Mil Family	-0.003 (0.027)	-0.006 (0.027)	0.096** (0.045)	-0.027 (0.027)
Mil Friends	-0.033*** (0.013)	0.009 (0.013)	0.073*** (0.021)	0.017 (0.013)
Constant	3.098*** (0.191)	2.216*** (0.191)	0.470 (0.332)	2.642*** (0.199)
Observations	1,936	2,013	2,199	1,875
R <sup>2</sup>	0.101	0.016	0.024	0.083
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.095	0.009	0.017	0.076

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

## 1.5 Subsetting by Party

Table 11: Effects hold subsetting to non-Republicans (TISS 1999)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Confidence (1)	Constrain (2)	Contest (3)	Limit (4)
Superiority	-0.180*** (0.030)	0.122*** (0.028)	0.256*** (0.048)	0.187*** (0.029)
<u>Covariates</u>				
Female	0.010 (0.056)	0.018 (0.052)	-0.165* (0.089)	0.105* (0.054)
Age	-0.047** (0.019)	-0.022 (0.018)	0.044 (0.032)	0.012 (0.018)
Education	0.043 (0.036)	-0.043 (0.034)	0.066 (0.060)	-0.091*** (0.035)
White	-0.061 (0.054)	-0.031 (0.051)	0.051 (0.087)	-0.009 (0.052)
Pray	0.008 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.026)	0.012 (0.015)
Evangelical	-0.062 (0.066)	-0.035 (0.061)	-0.072 (0.105)	0.044 (0.064)
South	0.042 (0.053)	0.072 (0.051)	-0.025 (0.088)	-0.054 (0.051)
Army	-0.085 (0.068)	-0.039 (0.064)	-0.029 (0.112)	-0.021 (0.065)
Rank	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.007 (0.008)	0.010** (0.005)
Deployed	-0.024 (0.054)	-0.081 (0.050)	-0.090 (0.088)	-0.073 (0.052)
Mil Family	0.005 (0.043)	0.083** (0.040)	0.109 (0.069)	-0.016 (0.041)
Mil Friends	-0.048** (0.020)	-0.018 (0.019)	0.077** (0.032)	0.034* (0.020)
Constant	3.657*** (0.341)	2.095*** (0.323)	-0.529 (0.563)	1.813*** (0.335)
Observations	776	817	906	756
R <sup>2</sup>	0.114	0.042	0.050	0.133
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.099	0.027	0.036	0.117

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

## 1.6 Mediation

Table 12 presents the Baron & Kenny (1986) approach to mediation, showing that 1) the coefficient on superiority weakens when controlling for confidence, and 2) that confidence has a strong correlation with each infraction of civilian control.

Table 12: Baron & Kenny Mediation, TISS Survey

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Confidence	Constrain		Contest		Limit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Superiority	-0.205*** (0.021)	0.046** (0.020)	0.027 (0.022)	0.157*** (0.035)	0.135*** (0.038)	0.163*** (0.020)	0.102*** (0.021)
Confidence			-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.167*** (0.042)		-0.300*** (0.023)
<u>Covariates</u>							
Female	-0.054 (0.041)	0.060 (0.039)	0.060 (0.042)	-0.143** (0.067)	-0.141* (0.073)	0.166*** (0.040)	0.163*** (0.040)
Age	-0.025** (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.017 (0.011)	0.014 (0.018)	0.016 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.010)
Education	0.070*** (0.020)	-0.036* (0.020)	-0.033 (0.021)	0.021 (0.035)	0.026 (0.036)	-0.106*** (0.021)	-0.081*** (0.020)
Republican	-0.105*** (0.027)	-0.010 (0.027)	-0.017 (0.028)	0.040 (0.046)	-0.017 (0.049)	0.019 (0.027)	-0.006 (0.026)
White	-0.047 (0.039)	-0.036 (0.039)	-0.044 (0.040)	0.040 (0.066)	0.001 (0.070)	-0.018 (0.038)	-0.042 (0.038)
Pray	0.023** (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)
Evangelical	-0.029 (0.039)	-0.060 (0.039)	-0.077* (0.041)	-0.018 (0.066)	-0.021 (0.071)	-0.038 (0.039)	-0.054 (0.038)
South	0.049 (0.033)	0.067** (0.033)	0.057* (0.034)	-0.060 (0.056)	-0.046 (0.059)	-0.002 (0.033)	0.021 (0.032)
Army	-0.016 (0.039)	-0.038 (0.038)	-0.060 (0.040)	-0.126* (0.068)	-0.118* (0.070)	-0.015 (0.039)	-0.028 (0.038)
Rank	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.006 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Deployed	-0.042 (0.031)	-0.057* (0.031)	-0.055* (0.032)	0.040 (0.055)	0.013 (0.057)	-0.043 (0.031)	-0.046 (0.031)
Mil Family	0.010 (0.027)	-0.014 (0.027)	-0.030 (0.028)	0.081* (0.046)	0.075 (0.049)	-0.040 (0.027)	-0.039 (0.027)
Mil Friends	-0.032** (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)	0.006 (0.014)	0.080*** (0.022)	0.087*** (0.023)	0.014 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)
Constant	3.268*** (0.194)	2.128*** (0.194)	2.408*** (0.214)	0.235 (0.338)	0.817** (0.375)	2.347*** (0.199)	3.300*** (0.208)
Observations	1,852	1,918	1,747	2,088	1,829	1,803	1,685
R <sup>2</sup>	0.118	0.017	0.024	0.029	0.037	0.111	0.194
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.111	0.010	0.016	0.023	0.030	0.104	0.187

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Table 13 presents a more formal mediation analysis (Imai et al 2011) for each type of infraction. For all three infractions, the effect of military superiority is at least partly mediated by reduced confidence of civilian leaders (second row,  $p < 0.01$  for all three). Between 20-38% of each effect appears to be mediated by reduced confidence.

Table 13: Mediation Analysis (Full Sample)

	<i>Dependent variable (OLS):</i>		
	Constrain (1)	Contest (2)	Limit (3)
Total Effect (superiority → DV)	0.044**	0.170***	0.163***
Mediated Effect (through confidence)	0.016***	0.035***	0.061***
Direct Effect (not through confidence)	0.027	0.135***	0.102***
Proportion Mediated (through confidence)	0.356**	0.210***	0.374***
Observations	1747	1829	1685

*Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$*

The mediation works among the non-Republicans as well:

Table 14: Mediation Analysis (Non-Republicans)

	<i>Dependent variable (OLS):</i>		
	Constrain (1)	Contest (2)	Limit (3)
Total Effect (superiority → DV)	0.117***	0.275***	0.177***
Mediated Effect (through confidence)	0.014**	0.036***	0.057***
Direct Effect (not through confidence)	0.103***	0.238***	0.120***
Proportion Mediated (through confidence)	0.124**	0.130***	0.323***
Observations	726	763	694

*Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$*

## 2 YouGov 2014

### 2.1 Military Superiority

To measure military superiority, we use the following four questions:

1. **Meritocratic:** “The military is more fair with how it handles promotion and awards than the rest of society.” (q9\_a)
2. **Fair:** “In general, the military is less fair than the rest of society.” (q9\_b, reverse coded)
3. **Ethical:** “The military has more ethical problems or scandals than the rest of society.” (q9\_d, reverse coded)
4. **Hardwork:** “Veterans are more reliable and hard-working than the rest of society” (q9\_f)

These four questions are significantly correlated with each other, so we average them into one composite variable *superiority*:

Table 15: Correlation Coefficients, Military Superiority

	meritocratic	fair	ethical
meritocratic			
fair	0.37****		
ethical	0.30****	0.43****	
hardwork	0.28****	0.24***	0.22**

### 2.2 Confidence in Civilians

There is just one variable to measure confidence: “How knowledgeable do you think our political leaders are about the modern military?” (q18)

## 2.3 Civilian Control

We then measure each component of civilian control:

1. **Constrain.** Count of two questions:

- “If a senior civilian Department of Defense leader asks a military officer to do something that the military officer believes is unwise but not illegal or immoral, would it be appropriate or inappropriate for the officer to...”
  - “Retire or leave the service in protest” (q25\_d)
- “If the President decides to withdraw completely from the Afghan war in 2014, does the military have a responsibility to...”
  - “Privately explain their concerns to Congress?” (q15\_c)

2. **Contest.** One question:

- “When the President makes a policy decision on the wars, does the military have a responsibility to support the policy?” (q14)

3. **Limit.** Average of two questions (correlation 0.25\*\*\*\*):

- “When force is used, military rather than political goals should determine its application” (q12c)
- “There are many different things that people say might keep the military from being effective during times of war. For each of the following, please indicate if it might greatly hurt military effectiveness, somewhat hurt military effectiveness, has no effect or is not happening at all:”
  - “Non-military people getting too involved in purely military affairs” (q23\_f)

## 2.4 Regressions

Table 16, from which Figures 5 and 6 (in text) are created, shows that military superiority correlates with both lower confidence in civilians and higher support for each type of infraction on civilian control.

Table 16: Correlations between Superiority, Confidence, and Civilian Control (YouGov 2014)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Confidence	Constrain	Contest	Limit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Superiority	-0.354*** (0.117)	0.233** (0.093)	0.103** (0.050)	0.340*** (0.080)
Age	-0.001 (0.004)	0.00003 (0.004)	-0.005*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.003)
Female	0.104 (0.131)	-0.090 (0.104)	0.091 (0.056)	0.149* (0.090)
Elite Sample	0.027 (0.137)	0.152 (0.109)	-0.130** (0.058)	-0.063 (0.093)
Constant	3.230*** (0.425)	0.387 (0.334)	0.147 (0.179)	0.794*** (0.287)
Observations	205	207	206	194
R <sup>2</sup>	0.053	0.052	0.108	0.167
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.034	0.033	0.090	0.149

*Note:* \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$



## 2.5 Mediation

Table 17 presents the Baron & Kenny (1986) mediation analysis. Confidence strongly correlates with not limiting civilian authority, and mediates the effect of superiority. There does not appear to be a mediation for constraining or contesting authority.

Table 17: Baron & Kenny mediation, YouGov

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Confidence	Constrain		Contest		Limit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Superiority	-0.354*** (0.117)	0.233** (0.093)	0.239** (0.096)	0.103** (0.050)	0.097* (0.051)	0.340*** (0.080)	0.288*** (0.079)
Confidence			-0.005 (0.056)		-0.037 (0.030)		-0.166*** (0.047)
Age	-0.001 (0.004)	0.00003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)
Female	0.104 (0.131)	-0.090 (0.104)	-0.101 (0.105)	0.091 (0.056)	0.092* (0.056)	0.149* (0.090)	0.170* (0.087)
Elite Sample	0.027 (0.137)	0.152 (0.109)	0.155 (0.109)	-0.130** (0.058)	-0.128** (0.058)	-0.063 (0.093)	-0.067 (0.090)
Constant	3.230*** (0.425)	0.387 (0.334)	0.351 (0.385)	0.147 (0.179)	0.234 (0.205)	0.794*** (0.287)	1.324*** (0.316)
Observations	205	207	205	206	204	194	194
R <sup>2</sup>	0.053	0.052	0.056	0.108	0.114	0.167	0.219
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.034	0.033	0.032	0.090	0.091	0.149	0.198

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Table 18 presents the Imai et al (2011) mediation analyses. Reduced confidence significantly mediates the effect of superiority on limiting civilian authority (third column, second row,  $p < 0.05$ ). Confidence does not appear to mediate the other two infractions.

Table 18: Mediation Analysis (YouGov 2014)

	<i>Dependent variable (OLS):</i>		
	Constrain	Contest	Limit
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Total Effect (superiority → DV)	0.238**	0.109**	0.343***
Mediated Effect (through confidence)	0.002	0.014	0.053***
Direct Effect (not through confidence)	0.236**	0.095*	0.291***
Proportion Mediated (through confidence)	0.007	0.12	0.146***
Observations	205	204	194

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

## 2.6 Additional Regressions

Table 19 splits up military superiority into its component parts, showing that each one also correlates with lower confidence in civilians.

Table 19: Correlation between Superiority and Confidence in Civilians (YouGov 2014)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Confidence (Civilians are knowledgeable)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Meritocratic	-0.174** (0.078)				
Fair		-0.136* (0.074)			
Ethical			-0.247*** (0.075)		
Hardworking				-0.214*** (0.077)	
Superiority					-0.354*** (0.117)
<u>Covariates</u>					
Age	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Female	0.222* (0.127)	0.192 (0.125)	0.195 (0.121)	0.157 (0.124)	0.104 (0.131)
Elite Sample	0.085 (0.136)	0.125 (0.133)	0.141 (0.130)	0.110 (0.132)	0.027 (0.137)
Constant	2.820*** (0.318)	2.841*** (0.313)	2.854*** (0.295)	3.070*** (0.309)	3.230*** (0.425)
Observations	226	236	239	250	205
R <sup>2</sup>	0.050	0.048	0.064	0.065	0.053
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.032	0.031	0.048	0.050	0.034

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

### **3 West Point 2020**

The survey of 770 cadets at the US Military Academy (USMA) at West Point was conducted between January 22-28, 2020 by emailing a Qualtrics link to cadets enrolled in introductory American politics and International Relations classes. Participation in the survey was incentivized through an offer of extra credit in those courses, resulting in a 71% response rate.

#### **Statement on Ethics**

There are no ethical challenges or perceived ethical challenges related to this survey. The project was deemed exempt by USMA's IRB. Informed and voluntary consent was obtained in Qualtrics at the start of the survey. Survey answers were fully anonymous and respondents could end the survey at any time. The questions asked were about views of politics and their profession along with standard demographic questions. The participant pool included the intended sample only of students enrolled at USMA. It did not include a vulnerable or marginalized community.

## Demographics


Table 20: Demographics of West Point Sample (N=770)

Demographic	Proportion
<b>Gender</b>	
Male	73.8
Female	26.2
<b>Party Identification</b>	
Democrat	24.2
Independent	18.2
Republican	57.7
<b>Race</b>	
White	67.3
Non-white	32.7
<b>Class</b>	
Plebe	7.1
Yearling	47.3
Cow	37.8
Firstie	7.8
<b>Age</b>	
≤19	23.4
20	37.0
21	25.3
22+	14.3
<b>Region</b>	
Midwest	17.7
Northeast	23.6
South	40.6
West	18.1
<b>Military Family</b>	46.4

### 3.1 Military Superiority

To measure superiority, we use: “Military culture is generally superior to the rest of society today” (superior). Figure 1 presents the results:

Figure 1: Military Superiority (West Point)






### 3.2 Confidence in Civilians

We use three questions to measure confidence in civilian leaders:

1. **Vet Pres:** “To be respected as Commander-in-chief, the President should have served in uniform.” (Q31)
2. **Vet Sec:** “To be respected in their position, the Secretary of Defense should have served in uniform.” (Q32)
3. **Ret Sec:** “More retired generals and admirals serving as cabinet secretaries or senior political appointees is good for the country.” (Q42)

Figure 2 presents the results.

Figure 2: Confidence in Civilian Leaders (West Point)



These three questions correlate so we average them into one composite, *confidence*.

Table 21: Correlation Coefficients, Confidence in Civilian Leaders

	vet pres	vet sec
vet pres		
vet sec	0.43****	
ret sec	0.20****	0.21****

### 3.3 Civilian Control

The survey provides three questions about limiting civilian authority:

1. **Run the War:** “In the ideal approach, there is a clear division between civilians and the military in decisions about the use of force. Civilians decide whether to commit forces and then military leaders take over and run the war. Each respects the other’s sphere and stays out of it.” (Q28)
2. **Follow:** “When the country is at war, the President should basically follow the advice of the generals.” (Q30)
3. **Timeline:** “It’s an inappropriate incursion into military autonomy for a civilian policymaker to establish a timeline on a military operation or campaign.” (Q35)


These three questions correlate so we average them into one composite, *limit*.

Table 22: Correlation Coefficients, Limit

	run the war	follow
run the war		
follow	0.17****	
timeline	0.13***	0.16****

Figure 3 presents the results for each.

Figure 3: Civilian Control (West Point)





### 3.4 Regressions

Table 23 shows that military superiority correlates with each component of confidence, namely wanting a veteran president, a veteran secretary of defense, and more generals in the cabinet. Table 24 shows that military superiority correlates with each component of limiting civilian authority, namely, that the military should run the war, that civilians should follow military advice, and that civilians should not set a timeline on military force. Figure 7 (in text) comes from Table 23, model 4, and Figure 8 (in text) from Table 24, model 4.

Table 23: Military Superiority and Lack of Confidence in Civilians (West Point)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Veteran Pres (1)	Veteran Sec (2)	More Generals in Cabinet (3)	Confidence (4)
Superiority	0.253*** (0.034)	0.197*** (0.038)	0.164*** (0.027)	-0.206*** (0.024)
<u>Covariates</u>				
Female	0.179** (0.081)	0.005 (0.093)	0.110* (0.066)	-0.098* (0.058)
Age	0.007 (0.035)	0.048 (0.040)	-0.009 (0.029)	-0.015 (0.025)
Republican	-0.196** (0.077)	0.134 (0.088)	0.133** (0.062)	-0.022 (0.054)
White	-0.119 (0.079)	-0.043 (0.090)	0.094 (0.064)	0.020 (0.056)
South	-0.109 (0.072)	-0.131 (0.081)	0.059 (0.058)	0.062 (0.051)
Class	-0.082 (0.058)	-0.025 (0.066)	0.012 (0.047)	0.031 (0.041)
Mil Family	0.118* (0.070)	-0.018 (0.080)	0.0001 (0.057)	-0.035 (0.050)
Constant	2.061*** (0.201)	2.740*** (0.228)	2.870*** (0.163)	3.443*** (0.142)
Observations	746	746	743	743
R <sup>2</sup>	0.091	0.046	0.070	0.098
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.081	0.036	0.060	0.088

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Table 24: Military Superiority and Limiting Civilian Authority (West Point)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Run the War (1)	Follow Mil Advice (2)	Timeline (3)	Limit (4)
Superiority	0.150*** (0.038)	0.117*** (0.034)	0.079** (0.034)	0.115*** (0.023)
<u>Covariates</u>				
Female	-0.421*** (0.092)	-0.009 (0.081)	-0.209** (0.083)	-0.213*** (0.055)
Age	0.018 (0.040)	-0.028 (0.035)	0.015 (0.036)	0.002 (0.024)
Republican	0.107 (0.087)	0.097 (0.077)	-0.053 (0.078)	0.050 (0.052)
White	-0.092 (0.089)	-0.148* (0.078)	0.086 (0.080)	-0.051 (0.054)
South	0.140* (0.081)	-0.067 (0.071)	-0.010 (0.073)	0.021 (0.049)
Class	0.050 (0.066)	-0.016 (0.058)	0.057 (0.059)	0.030 (0.040)
Mil Family	0.043 (0.079)	0.066 (0.070)	-0.022 (0.071)	0.029 (0.048)
Constant	2.484*** (0.227)	3.022*** (0.200)	2.636*** (0.203)	2.714*** (0.137)
Observations	746	746	746	746
R <sup>2</sup>	0.072	0.029	0.023	0.070
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.062	0.018	0.013	0.059

*Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$*

### 3.5 Subsetting by Party

Results are not driven by the Democrats in the sample, who may have had especially low confidence in President Trump and sought to limit his authority. Instead, results hold both among the Republicans and the non-Republicans in the sample. The following section shows that the mediation holds among both subsets as well.

Table 25: Subsets by Party, West Point (2020)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	<b>Non-Republicans</b>		<b>Republicans</b>	
	Confidence (1)	Limit (2)	Confidence (3)	Limit (4)
Superiority	-0.230*** (0.039)	0.126*** (0.037)	-0.189*** (0.030)	0.104*** (0.030)
<u>Covariates</u>				
Female	-0.095 (0.082)	-0.227*** (0.077)	-0.100 (0.083)	-0.203** (0.081)
Age	-0.023 (0.036)	0.005 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.036)	-0.008 (0.035)
White	-0.008 (0.080)	-0.057 (0.075)	0.031 (0.081)	-0.010 (0.079)
South	0.095 (0.082)	0.015 (0.077)	0.041 (0.065)	0.024 (0.063)
Class	0.034 (0.062)	0.039 (0.058)	0.027 (0.056)	0.026 (0.055)
Mil Family	-0.089 (0.081)	0.160** (0.076)	0.004 (0.063)	-0.071 (0.062)
Constant	3.564*** (0.213)	2.598*** (0.200)	3.319*** (0.191)	2.865*** (0.186)
Observations	316	316	427	430
R <sup>2</sup>	0.111	0.089	0.086	0.056
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.091	0.068	0.070	0.040

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

### 3.6 Mediation

Table 26 shows the Baron & Kenny (1986) mediation, demonstrating that the coefficient on superiority weakens when controlling for confidence, and that confidence has a significant correlation with limiting civilian authority.

Table 26: Baron & Kenny mediation, West Point

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Confidence	Limit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Superiority	-0.206*** (0.024)	0.115*** (0.023)	0.062*** (0.023)
Confidence			-0.268*** (0.034)
<u>Covariates</u>			
Female	-0.098* (0.058)	-0.213*** (0.055)	-0.240*** (0.054)
Age	-0.015 (0.025)	0.002 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.023)
Republican	-0.022 (0.054)	0.050 (0.052)	0.044 (0.051)
White	0.020 (0.056)	-0.051 (0.054)	-0.044 (0.052)
South	0.062 (0.051)	0.021 (0.049)	0.034 (0.047)
Class	0.031 (0.041)	0.030 (0.040)	0.037 (0.038)
Mil Family	-0.035 (0.050)	0.029 (0.048)	0.024 (0.046)
Constant	3.443*** (0.142)	2.714*** (0.137)	3.645*** (0.177)
Observations	743	746	743
R <sup>2</sup>	0.098	0.070	0.142
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.088	0.059	0.132

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Table 27 shows the Imai et al (2011) mediation, showing that there is indeed a significant mediated effect through confidence. Models 2 and 3 then show that the mediation also holds for non-Republicans and Republicans separately.

Table 27: Mediation Analysis (West Point 2020)

	<i>Dependent variable (OLS):</i>		
	Full Sample (1)	Non-Republicans (2)	Republicans (3)
Total Effect (superiority → limit)	0.117***	0.130***	0.106***
Mediated Effect (through confidence)	0.055***	0.076***	0.040***
Direct Effect (not through confidence)	0.062***	0.054	0.067**
Proportion Mediated (through confidence)	0.468***	0.587***	0.370***
Observations	743	316	427

*Note:* \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$