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WHY SUDAN SUCCEEDED WHERE ALGERIA FAILED

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In April 2019, mass uprisings toppled two longtime dictators: Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika (1999–2019) and Sudan's Omar al-Bashir (1989–2019). However, protesters in both countries soon discovered that ousting a dictator was not enough to initiate a political transition. They therefore remained in the streets, demanding the dismantling of the authoritarian regime and a genuine transition to democracy. But from there, the paths of the two countries diverged.

By August 2019, Sudanese protesters had secured a power-sharing agreement with the remnants of Bashir's regime, initiating a transition to democracy shepherded by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. In Algeria, by contrast, protesters continued to demonstrate until May 2021, but were unable to compel the regime to begin a transition. What explains this divergence? Why were protesters in Sudan able to secure a transition to democracy, while Algerians were not, despite both having overthrown their dictators?

The answer lies in the ability of all sides in Sudan to negotiate and embark on a “pacted transition,” to borrow language from Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter's classic work *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*.¹ Although pacts and revolutions are generally considered to be distinct pathways of democratization, the cases of Algeria and Sudan suggest that where the military remains a powerful political force, pacts between it and the opposition may be critical to initiating a transition even after deposing a dictator. Yet the conditions under which such pacts emerge are less clear: O'Donnell and Schmitter argued that pacts arise not due to any structural precondition but rather to leaders' agency and statecraft. While later scholars have identified structural

predictors such as prior regime type and the form of regime breakdown, a comparison of Algeria and Sudan suggests that additional factors may also help to facilitate such pacts.

A pacted transition was possible in Sudan but not in Algeria because of important differences in the makeup and actions of three key players: the protesters, the regime, and the international community. First, the protests in Sudan were helmed by a national labor union with the strength and credibility to negotiate on the protesters' behalf, whereas Algeria's protests were more decentralized and leaderless, leaving protesters without a clear representative for negotiations. Second, Sudan's security forces were divided and often at odds with one another, while Algeria's were united, producing little incentive to come to the table. Finally, the international community helped to mediate and broker the power-sharing deal that led to Sudan's transition, in large part due to the regime's violent repression of the protests. Algeria, however, drew less international attention and interference given its comparatively restrained response to the protests.

Overall, the two cases underscore that even massive, nonviolent uprisings that succeed in ousting a dictator do not automatically produce transitions to democracy. Regimes across the Middle East and North Africa have had ten years since the Arab Spring to learn how to jettison their leaders and survive such uprisings without democratizing. At the same time, protesters have also learned not to trust these ploys, and to remain in the streets until real change is realized.² But, as the experiences of Algeria and Sudan demonstrate, protesters need not only sustained mobilization but also organization, divided regimes, and international pressure to convert a revolution into a transition.

The Arab Spring 2.0

Algeria and Sudan, two of the largest countries in Africa in size and population (both around 43 million), share a number of historical and structural characteristics that make them relatively unlikely candidates for democracy. Both have highly politicized, interventionist militaries that have thwarted earlier attempts at democratization, with Sudan seeing coups in 1958, 1969, and 1989, and Algeria in 1965 and 1992. Both have relatively fresh memories of civil war—and this is thought to have discouraged mobilization in both countries during the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. Finally, both are largely oil-dependent economies whose governments used their oil wealth to repress and coopt their populations.

But with the collapse of oil prices in 2014, both countries struggled to maintain their patronage networks, generating economic grievances among their populations. According to the Arab Barometer surveys, 66 percent of Algerians ranked the economy as good or very good in 2013; by 2016, this number had fallen to 27 percent and by 2019, on the eve of

the protests, to a mere 13 percent. Likewise, the share of Sudanese rating their economy as good or very good fell from 39 percent in 2011 to just 16 percent in December 2018.

In Sudan, the regime eventually came to the table after a brutal massacre of protesters failed to quell the unrest and drew international condemnation. In Algeria, by contrast, protesters are still at square one.

Not surprisingly, then, economic grievances helped to fuel mass uprisings against the Bashir and Bouteflika regimes in the spring of 2019. In Sudan, austerity measures tripled the price of bread overnight, setting off protests in the northeastern city of Atbara on 19 December 2018 that quickly spread across the country. In Algeria, the spark for the first protests on 22 February 2019 was more political: the nomination of the country's ailing president for a fifth term in office, despite his near paralysis. By

March 2019, both countries were in the throes of revolution, with protesters adopting the Arab Spring slogan, "The people want the fall of the regime."

Both sets of protesters simultaneously rejected their regime while also explicitly fraternizing with the military, seeking to get the soldiers on their side. Protesters in Algeria chanted "the army and the people are brothers, brothers"; in Sudan, they chanted "the army and the people are one." In turn, the military in both countries defected, facilitating the overthrow of each dictator in April 2019. On April 2, the chief of staff of Algeria's army, Ahmed Gaid Salah, called for the immediate resignation of Bouteflika, who complied within hours. Nine days later, Sudan's military followed suit, arresting Bashir and installing a transitional military council.

In neither country, however, did the removal of the dictator satisfy the demonstrators. Protests continued, demanding deeper and more systemic change, particularly the uprooting of the remainder of the regime and a complete transition to democracy. Protesters in both countries had learned from the experience of the Arab Spring to stay in the streets. As one Sudanese protester explained, "We didn't want to repeat the mistakes of Egypt, where the people left the streets after Mubarak fell."³

But while protesters in both Sudan and Algeria continued to rally, the trajectories of the two uprisings soon diverged. In Sudan, the regime eventually came to the table after a brutal massacre of protesters on June 3 failed to quell the unrest and drew international condemnation. The two sides reached a power-sharing agreement on August 17 that replaced the military council with the joint civilian-military Sovereignty Council. The Sovereignty Council then appointed UN economist Abdalla Hamdok as prime minister to lead the country to democratic elections

in late 2022. While major challenges remain, Sudan can be said to have at least embarked on a transition to democracy.

In Algeria, by contrast, protesters are still—two years later—at square one. Protesters continued to march weekly until March 2020 (when the covid-19 lockdown temporarily brought them to a halt) and then again from February to May 2021. But rather than negotiate with the Hirak (or “movement” in Arabic), the regime chose to simply ignore the protests and pressed forward with its own roadmap: presidential elections in 2019, a constitutional referendum in 2020, and parliamentary elections in 2021.⁴ The Hirak boycotted each step, but to no avail. No pact was ever formed between the regime and the Hirak that could have initiated a democratic transition.

The question then becomes: Why was Sudan able to secure a pact but Algeria was not? Three factors stand out: 1) the differing level of organization among protesters; 2) the unity/disunity of the regime’s security forces; and 3) international mediation, or lack thereof.

The Power of Organization

The backbone of Sudan’s protests was the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), an unlicensed umbrella of labor unions formed in 2016 by doctors, lawyers, and journalists in response to the deteriorating economy.⁵ On 1 January 2019, twelve days after protests erupted, the SPA spearheaded the Declaration of Freedom and Change, which called for the immediate removal of Bashir and the initiation of a four-year transition focused on negotiating peace agreements, improving the economy, and building democratic institutions ahead of elections.

The Declaration of Freedom and Change provided a focal point for Sudanese protesters to rally around and unite in their demands. In total, 22 organizations signed on to the Declaration, including civil society groups, women’s rights organizations, opposition political parties, and even the armed rebels of the Sudan Revolutionary Front. These disparate groups, in turn, coalesced into the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC). The leadership of the SPA was therefore critical in unifying Sudanese demands and organizations into a common political vision. As Sudanese scholar Nisrin Elamin wrote in 2020, “what makes the ongoing revolution so powerful is that it is *leaderfull*, rather than leaderless.”⁶

By the time Bashir fell, the SPA and FFC had the credibility and organization to represent the protesters in negotiations with the transitional military council, ultimately securing the August 2019 power-sharing agreement. In other words, in Sudan, there was a clear partner among the protesters with whom the regime could negotiate.

In Algeria, by contrast, protesters were far more decentralized and leaderless. The Hirak assumed its own repertoire of student protests on Tuesdays and mass protests after Friday prayers, creating a regular pat-

tern that eschewed the need for an umbrella organization to set protest dates and locations.⁷ Opposition parties, for their part, were largely viewed as coopted by the regime, preventing them from capitalizing on the spontaneous protests. Likewise, Algeria lacked a powerful labor union with the credibility of Sudan's SPA, which could have helped to unify political parties and civil society groups.

Activists within the Hirak also intentionally maintained its decentralized, leaderless nature, conscious of how Algeria's regime had coopted protest leaders in the past. As Algerian scholar Dalia Ghanem has argued, the Hirak protesters

remember the Kabyle's citizen movement or the *Aârouch* in 2001 that developed good bargaining power and that managed to extract concessions . . . [but] eventually lost momentum . . . mainly due to the regime's manipulation and ability to co-opt its leaders. As such, [the Hirak] protesters refused to name leaders who will look [only] at their [own] interests and empty the movement from its mobilization potential and meaning.⁸

As a result, after Bouteflika was removed, there was no leadership within the Hirak with whom the regime could negotiate. While there were some popular figures in the movement—including the lawyer and politician Mostefa Bouchachi, journalist and politician Karim Tabbou, and veteran of the war of independence Djamilia Bouhired—they faced an impossible “coordination game”: Without a central leadership to bring them all simultaneously to the table, anyone who dared to enter into negotiations with the regime risked being branded a sellout.⁹ When the regime proposed a National Dialogue Commission in 2019 led by former minister and parliamentary speaker Karim Younes, the initiative fizzled out after Bouchachi and Bouhired (among others) refused to join, and the lesser-known figures who did join lost credibility among the Hirak. But without negotiations, the movement has been unable to convert its people power into political power.

The lack of central leadership also inhibited the Hirak in a second way: by making it more difficult to escalate tactics to impose greater costs on the regime. The weekly Tuesday and Friday protests garnered concessions at first, but by August 2019 the regime began to simply accept and ignore the transitory marches. An escalation in tactics—for instance, staging a mass sit-in or a nationwide general strike—could in theory have brought regime leaders to the table. But shifting gears was difficult without a central leadership to spearhead such change.

While the protest movements' level of organization constitutes a major difference between the uprisings in Algeria and Sudan, it is arguably the least important of the three key factors highlighted here. Even if the Algerian opposition had a central leadership, there is no guarantee that the regime would negotiate with it—indeed, the regime has shown little interest in coming to the table or making genuine concessions. What ex-

plains the Sudanese regime's willingness to negotiate and the Algerian regime's refusal?

The (Dis)Unity of Security Forces

A second factor contributing to Sudan's transition was the fragmentation of state security forces.¹⁰ The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) had historically been the dominant military and political force in the country, staging multiple coups, developing an arms industry, and enjoying close ties with Omar al-Bashir and Bashir's initial political ally, the Islamist Hassan al-Turabi. Bashir, however, soon grew suspicious of Turabi, leading him to counterbalance the military by strengthening two other security forces.

The first was the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), the regime's secret police. With members recruited primarily from Arab tribes along the Nile River (like Bashir himself), the NISS became the president's first line of defense, torturing dissidents in the country's notorious "ghost houses." In the 2010s, however, Bashir also became suspicious of NISS leader Salah Gosh, leading the president to privilege yet another security force, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF was formed in 2013 out of the Janjaweed militia that had committed genocide and war crimes in the western province of Darfur during the early 2000s. Its members were recruited primarily from among the Rizeigat, a nomadic Arab tribe in Darfur. Becoming Bashir's Praetorian Guard, the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan "Hemedti" Dagalo, profited from its control over the Jebel Amer gold mines in North Darfur and by working as foreign mercenaries for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in their operations in Yemen and Libya. Sudan's military, for its part, resented the rise of these rival forces. The SAF, with soldiers drafted from throughout the country, viewed itself as a more professional and national institution.

Recognizing these divergent interests, Sudanese protesters led by the SPA sought to get the SAF on their side. On 6 April 2019, they staged a sit-in at army headquarters in the capital city of Khartoum, hoping to pull the military away from the regime. The next day, the regime sent the NISS to attack the protesters, but the army conscripts and some junior officers defected and defended the demonstrators from the NISS. This raised the specter of civil war—of one regime security force fighting another regime security force—and convinced the leaders of all three forces to work together to topple Bashir.¹¹

The détente was short-lived, however, as tensions resurfaced in the months that followed. The army and the RSF first colluded to disempower the NISS. They sacked NISS leader Salah Gosh and eventually rebranded the organization as the General Intelligence Service (GIS), limiting its jurisdiction to intelligence gathering and ending its role in internal

security operations. But the SAF and RSF quarreled over the latter's predilection for violence. The military leadership reportedly opposed the RSF's massacre of protesters on June 3, and wanted RSF leader Hemedti to resign afterward.¹² When the RSF then shot and killed schoolchildren in El-Obeid on June 30, army general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, leader of the transitional military council, publicly condemned the killings.

That daylight between the SAR and the RSF eventually pushed the military to restart negotiations with the opposition. As the International Crisis Group observed, "many of Sudan's officer corps would sooner trust their fate to Khartoum's opposition elite than to Hemedti, whom they view as a thuggish provincial warlord."¹³ The military's willingness to come to the table then pressured the RSF, begrudgingly, to do the same.

In Algeria, there has been no such fragmentation within the regime's security forces for protesters to capitalize on. Since liberating the country from France in 1962, the People's National Army (ANP) has been and remains the center of power.¹⁴ While there is a paramilitary force—the national gendarmerie—it is directly under the military's command, not a counterbalancing force like Sudan's RSF.

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, however, there were internal rivalries within the military, particularly between the army and military intelligence (the Département du renseignement et de la sécurité, or DRS). The DRS had played a central role in the country's civil war (1990–2002), with its chief, Mohamed "Toufik" Mediène, presenting himself as the "God of Algeria" (*rabb dzair*). President Bouteflika initially seemed to exploit this rivalry between the army and DRS to prevent a unified challenge to his rule.

After Bouteflika suffered a stroke in April 2013, however, the presidency worked with the army to defang the DRS.¹⁵ In September 2013, the DRS's judicial police and media-monitoring center were transferred to the command of army chief of staff General Ahmed Gaid Salah, a veteran of Algeria's war for independence from France (1954–62). The general was simultaneously elevated to deputy defense minister. Mediène was eventually sacked in September 2015, and each of the DRS's operational units—army security (DCSA), presidential security (DGSP), and the special intervention group (GIS)—were then transferred to Gaid Salah.¹⁶ What remained of the DRS was simply an intelligence service, not an operational counterweight to the army, and in January 2016 the DRS was placed under the presidency and rebranded the Direction des services de sécurité (DSS). A string of purges in 2018 then ensured that the military was uniformly behind Gaid Salah.

Thus by the time of the 2019 protests, there were few internal factions to pit against one another. In the wake of Bouteflika's ouster, General Gaid Salah took further steps to limit any potential internal challenges, arresting both Mediène and his successor, Athmane "Bachir"

Tartag, and moving the DSS under the military's command.¹⁷ Unlike in Sudan, therefore, there was no looming threat of infighting to facilitate a transition in Algeria.

General Gaid Salah's passing in December 2019 could have created an opportunity, but the smooth transition to General Said Chengriha, commander of the country's ground forces, prevented any opening. As one retired general noted, "The army hierarchy is unified and it will move on after Gaid Salah as it did before him. Algeria's army is a single block, not under the influence of one general but with consensus as its engine."¹⁸ Moreover, the fortuitous timing of Gaid Salah's passing, which coincided with the election of former prime minister Abdelmadjid Tebboune as president, allowed Chengriha to pull the army back behind the scenes. That retreat temporarily refocused public attention on Tebboune rather than on the military, reducing pressure that might have caused the military to split. Thus the intraregime tensions that helped convince Sudan's military to negotiate were absent in Algeria.

The Pressure of Geopolitics

The final factor contributing to a transition in Sudan that was absent in the case of Algeria was international pressure. In the summer of 2019, the United States, the United Kingdom, Ethiopia, and the African Union, and eventually Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, all actively pressed the Sudanese regime to join the SPA at the negotiating table. The involvement of these countries stemmed in part from their greater geopolitical interests in Sudan. But international scrutiny had long been focused on the country due to the genocide in Darfur, the independence of South Sudan after a more than two-decade-long civil war (1983–2005), and Sudan's presence on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Yet the spark that led to international mediation in Sudan was of the regime's own making—the June 3 massacre, in which the RSF fired on unarmed protesters, killing at least a hundred people and dumping many of their bodies into the Nile River. While intended to suppress the protests, that massacre backfired in two ways: First, protesters relaunched their movement on June 30 on an even larger scale, admirably remaining committed to nonviolence despite the brutality they faced. Second, the massacre also brought international condemnation and a renewed spotlight on the regime, with the African Union suspending Sudan's membership on June 6. Notably, the backlash from the massacre also led the regime's allies in the Gulf to publicly and privately press the military council to negotiate.¹⁹

That pressure in turn allowed the African Union and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of neighboring Ethiopia to broker negotiations between the military council and the protesters. Donald Booth, the U.S. special

envoy for Sudan, and Tibor Nagy, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, as well as a number of European and Gulf partners, likewise played important roles in getting all sides to the table.

In Algeria, however, there were no such international attempts at mediation. The country's decade-long war of liberation from France made it staunchly anti-imperialist, protective of its independence, and inclined to keep foreign powers at bay. In the 1970s and 1980s, Algeria's relative neutrality made it an effective mediator in regional and international crises. But its civil war in the 1990s made the country turn inward, and it has kept a relatively low profile ever since.²⁰


Accordingly, when the Hirak protests emerged, few countries had strong geopolitical reasons to weigh in on the internal conflict, let alone to step in and mediate. The United States issued a public statement in March 2019 in favor of a "new path forward based on dialogue," but then went silent until the December 2019 elections, when it congratulated Tebboune on his victory. The African Union did the same, calling for dialogue in March 2019, but then applauding the government in 2020 for leading a purportedly "consultative process on the new constitution." France and Russia, moreover, have been wary of the Hirak, fearing that a democratic transition might weaken their relations with Algeria, and have not pressed the regime to reform.²¹ Similarly, Algeria's neighbors could not play the role of Ethiopia in Sudan, as Morocco has historically been a rival, not a trusted mediator, and Tunisia was preoccupied with its own domestic political transition.

Moreover, compared with the harsh crackdowns against demonstrators in Sudan by the RSF and NISS, the Algerian security forces were relatively restrained in dealing with the Hirak. Although they arrested scores of protesters discreetly, they did not publicly beat up or shoot protesters in the streets in 2019 and 2020.²² Without bloodshed, Algeria's protest movement was unable to attract the international attention and scrutiny given to the Sudanese protests. To illustrate, worldwide Google search trends between 2018 and 2020 (see the Figure below) indicate that Sudan consistently garnered more hits than Algeria, with major spikes after the overthrow of Bashir and the June 3 massacre. Algeria, meanwhile, saw no corresponding spike after the overthrow of Bouteflika and had no massacre or focal point to draw attention afterward. Without sustained international coverage, Algeria's regime faced little foreign pressure to come to the table and initiate a pacted transition.

Untold Futures

The experiences of Algeria and Sudan demonstrate that pacts between the regime and opposition may be critical to initiating a transition even in cases where a mass uprising succeeds in deposing a dictator. In countries where the military remains a dominant political force, power-

FIGURE—GLOBAL GOOGLE SEARCH TRENDS FOR ALGERIA AND SUDAN, 2018–20



Source: Google Trends, <https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=2018-12-01%202020-03-01&q=Algeria,Sudan>.

sharing deals help to assuage the generals’ fears about what a transition might mean for their interests. Yet why pacts emerge in some countries but not others has been less clear. Comparing the cases of Sudan and Algeria shows how differences in the level of organization among the opposition, the degree of unity in the regime, and the extent of international pressure help to explain why Sudan has embarked on a pacted transition while Algeria has not, despite both having toppled their long-time dictators.

For the international community, the two experiences also highlight the importance of presenting a unified front in favor of a pact. Sudan’s pact was formed only after Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates finally came around and pressured the regime to negotiate. Their about-face was surprising, given the more deleterious role that they played in crushing Bahrain’s uprising in 2011, supporting Egypt’s coup and counterrevolution in 2013, and fueling civil wars in Libya and Yemen. Sudan’s experience thus underscores the importance of international scrutiny and diplomatic pressure in pushing even counterrevolutionary powers to support a pacted transition.

Still, neither Algeria’s story nor Sudan’s is over. Algeria may well democratize yet, as protesters learn from their experience in 2019–21. Although at the time of this writing in August 2021 Algeria’s protests appear to have fizzled out, protesters may return to the streets after the covid pandemic is fully over. A related plot twist might concern the

health of President Tebboune. The 75-year-old was hospitalized for nearly two months with a serious covid infection in late 2020. If he were to pass away, it might create a renewed opportunity for a transition.

Sudan's transition, meanwhile, is facing its own set of challenges. Despite getting the country off the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism by normalizing relations with Israel, Prime Minister Hamdok and the Sovereignty Council are struggling to improve the economy. Important democratic institutions, including a constitutional court and transitional parliament, remain to be established. Even more challenging tasks—such as institutionalizing civilian control and oversight of the security forces and their revenue streams—could very well spark a coup that ends the transition.²³ But for now, Sudan has surprised and inspired the world by keeping on the path toward democracy against all odds.

NOTES

1. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). See also Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23 (October 1990): 1–21; Frances Hagopian, "'Democracy by Undemocratic Means': Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil," *Comparative Political Studies* 23 (July 1990): 147–70; and Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

2. Michele Dunne, "Fear and Learning in the Arab Uprisings," *Journal of Democracy* 31 (January 2020): 182–92; Kristen A. Harkness, "Policy Roundtable: The Military and Mass Protests in Africa," *Texas National Security Review*, 5 May 2021, <https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-military-and-mass-protests-in-africa>. For the importance of sustained mobilization, see also Jonathan C. Pinckney, *From Dissent to Democracy: The Promise and Perils of Civil Resistance Transitions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

3. Quoted in Rebecca Hamilton, "The Enemies of Sudan's Democracy Are Lurking Everywhere," *Foreign Policy*, 6 December 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/06/sudan-democracy-enemies-everywhere-bashir>.

4. Yahia H. Zoubir, "Why, After One Year, Protests Continue to Rock Algeria," *The Conversation*, 12 March 2020, <https://theconversation.com/why-after-one-year-protests-continue-to-rock-algeria-133238>; Frédéric Volpi, "Algeria: When Elections Hurt Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 31 (April 2020): 152–65; Rayane Anser, "How Algeria's New Regime Won a Referendum but Lost Legitimacy," *OpenDemocracy*, 13 November 2020, www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/how-algerias-new-regime-won-a-referendum-but-lost-legitimacy; Tin Hinane El Kadi, "Algeria: When Boycott Is the Best Way to Participate," Chatham House, 9 November 2020, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/11/algeria-when-boycott-best-way-participate>. For more on ignoring as a regime response to protest, see Dina Bishara, "The Politics of Ignoring: Protest Dynamics in Late Mubarak Egypt," *Perspectives on Politics* 13 (December 2015): 958–75.

5. Magdi El-Gizouli, "The Fall of al-Bashir: Mapping Contestation Forces in Sudan," Arab Reform Initiative, 12 April 2019, www.arab-reform.net/publication/the-fall-of-al-bashir-mapping-contestation-forces-in-sudan; Mohammed Elnaiem, "Armed, Unarmed, and Non-Violent: The Sudanese Resistance in Sudan's 2018–2019 Revolutionary Upris-

ing,” *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 43 (Summer 2019): 5–26; and Elsadig Elsheikh, “Sudan After Revolt: Reimagining Society, Surviving Vengeance,” *Critical Times* 2 (December 2019): 466–78. After its formation, the SPA came to include seventeen associations across multiple sectors. See: www.sudaneseprofessionals.org/en/about-us.

6. Nisrin Elamin, “‘Beyond Regime Change’: Reflections on Sudan’s Ongoing Revolution,” POMEPS, 16 June 2020, <https://pomeps.org/beyond-regime-change-reflections-on-sudans-ongoing-revolution>. See Declaration and signatories here: www.sudaneseprofessionals.org/en/declaration-of-freedom-and-change. While new, the SPA could draw on a legacy of syndicates playing similar roles in the 1964 and 1985 uprisings.

7. Neil Ketchley and Christopher Barrie likewise argue that in Egypt Friday prayers can take the place of a central organization; see Neil Ketchley and Christopher Barrie, “Fridays of Revolution: Focal Days and Mass Protest in Egypt and Tunisia,” *Political Research Quarterly* 73 (June 2020): 308–24.

8. Dalia Ghanem, “Algeria’s Hirak: Why Such a Mass Movement Achieved So Little,” *Manara Magazine*, 15 December 2020, <https://manaramagazine.org/2020/12/15/algerias-hirak-why-such-a-mass-movement-achieved-so-little>. For internal divisions in the Hirak, see also Zine Labidine Ghebouli, “Algeria’s Political Crisis: An Ongoing Vicious Cycle,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Firak Forum blog, 5 February 2021, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/algerias-political-crisis-ongoing-vicious-cycle.

9. Sharan Grewal, M. Tahir Kilavuz, and Robert Kubinec, “Algeria’s Uprising: A Survey of Protesters and the Military,” Brookings Institution, July 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/algerias-uprising-a-survey-of-protesters-and-the-military>. This inability to come to the table was not lost on the regime. Former Foreign Minister Sabri Boukadoum claimed that “there are many who want to discuss but don’t want to do it publicly, because of the pressure of the street.” See www.youtube.com/watch?v=POk46qq3Q8A, at 38:14.

10. Mai Hassan and Ahmed Kodouda, “Sudan’s Uprising: The Fall of a Dictator,” *Journal of Democracy* 30 (October 2019): 89–103; Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, “Bad Company: How Dark Money Threatens Sudan’s Transition,” European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2020; and International Crisis Group, “Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution,” Report no. 281, 19 October 2019, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/281-safeguarding-sudans-revolution>.

11. Hassan and Kodouda, 100; Alex de Waal, “A Cruel April in the Sudan Spring?” *African Arguments*, 12 April 2019, <https://africanarguments.org/2019/04/cruel-april-sudan-spring/>; Nathaniel Allen and Luka Kuol, “Civil-Military Relations and Sudan’s Treacherous Path to Democracy,” in Harkness, “Policy Roundtable: The Military and Mass Protest in Africa.”

12. Rashid Abdi (@RAbdiAnalyst), Twitter, 6 June 2019, 12:56 AM, <https://twitter.com/RAbdiAnalyst/status/1136497181341487110>. Air force chief Lieutenant General Salah Abdel Khalig claimed that the army’s senior leadership opposed the RSF’s attack on the sit-in. See Tom Wilson, “Sudan’s Air Force Chief Insists Army Prepared to Hand Over Power,” *Financial Times*, 13 June 2019, www.ft.com/content/86b741be-8d30-11e9-a1c1-51bf8f989972.

13. International Crisis Group, “Sudan: Stopping a Spiral into Civil War,” 7 June 2019, www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudan-stopping-spiral-civil-war. See also Samuel Ramani, “Sudan’s Imperiled Political Transition,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 17 March 2021, <https://carnegie-mec.org/2021/03/17/sudan-s-imperiled-political-transition-pub-84077>.

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