Supplementary Appendix for:

Matthew D. Cebul and Sharan Grewal, "Military Conscription and Nonviolent Resistance," *Comparative Political Studies*.

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Contents

1 Algeria Survey

1.1 Recruitment

The survey experiment in Algeria was fielded between April 1-3, 2019. Respondents were recruited into the survey through advertisements on Facebook that were shown to all 19 million adult Algerian Facebook users. The Facebook advertisement (figure 3) featured a picture of the Algerian flag with the title: "Algeria Politics Survey." The text says "Take this academic survey from Princeton University about Algerian politics." Clicking the advertisement took users out of Facebook and into Qualtrics, a survey platform. Once in Qualtrics, respondents were presented with a consent form, and then allowed to proceed to the survey.

Figure 3: Facebook advertisement

Our motivation for recruiting respondents through Facebook, rather than face-to-face, was driven by ethical considerations. When Algeria's protests erupted in February 2019 and we began to consider survey options, we learned that the partner of the most recent Arab Barometer survey, conducted right before the protests, was placed under house arrest. We accordingly decided not to place any enumerator or survey team at risk by instead pursuing an online approach that we could implement ourselves.

Yet while online surveys eliminate risks for enumerators, there may still be risk for re-

spondents. Algerians have, for instance, been prosecuted for Facebook posts deemed critical of the regime. However, our survey does not involve any respondent posting anything on Facebook: just to click on a Facebook advertisement and then fill out an anonymous survey in Qualtrics. Replication files likewise do not contain any personally identifying information that the regime could use to prosecute individuals. Any risks to respondents from the regime, therefore, are minimal.

There are also important ethical considerations regarding the data Facebook collects on its users. However, since our survey was conducted on Qualtrics, not Facebook, all Facebook learns is whether a user clicked on an advertisement: not their answers to the survey or even if they took the survey at all. Likewise, Qualtrics does not gain access to a user's Facebook profile and only records which advertisement brought them to the survey.

1.2 Survey Procedure

Once in Qualtrics, users could choose to take the survey in Arabic, French, or English. Over 93% chose to take the survey in Arabic, with the remainder in French. In the interests of transparency, a banner featuring the Princeton University Qualtrics logo headed every page.

Figure 4: First page of Qualtrics survey

On the first page, respondents answered three eligibility questions (age over 18, Algerian nationality, and currently living in Algeria). We later verified that they were living in Algeria using the geolocation of IP addresses; we exclude any survey completed outside of

Algeria. After answering the eligibility questions, eligible users then proceeded to the consent form, which described all risks and benefits to the users. If they clicked agree, they could proceed to the survey, knowing they could terminate the survey at any time. The survey itself featured nearly 100 questions, including demographics, attitudes toward the protests, attitudes toward the military and toward democracy, and intended voting behavior. The questionnaire featured randomization in question order as well as answer order.

To incentivize Algerians to complete the entire survey, we offered cell phone credit as a reward for completion. In the consent form, respondents were informed that if they completed the survey, they would receive 100DZD (<$1) of mobile phone credit. At the end of the survey, respondents who wished to claim their reward were taken to a separate platform, a Google form, where they could enter their mobile phone number separate from their survey answers. We subsequently sent phone credit remotely using the Swiss company CY.SEND, which partners with the three largest mobile phone companies in Algeria: Mobilis, Djezzy, and Ooredoo. In total, only one-third of survey takers chose to enter their phone numbers and receive credit.

1.3 Representativeness

Cognizant of the biases in an online, Facebook population, we followed Zhang et al. (2018) in setting age and gender quotas to attempt to generate a more representative sample. We created multiple advertisements (each with the same ad) and targeted each to a specific age-gender group: Algerian women aged 35-44, for instance.[1] We then altered how much we would spend on each advertisement each day (the "quota"): we set the minimum, $1/day, for groups over-represented on Facebook, such as men aged 18-24 and 25-34. We spent progressively larger amounts on under-represented groups, up to $10/day on Algerian women over 65 years old. The amount spent affects how long each day the ad would be shown to

[1]Separately, we also ran one advertisement that was targeted towards military personnel. We exclude all military personnel from this paper, though we include any civilians who were recruited through this ad (controlling for their ad in all regressions).

the targeted demographic.

These quotas created a slightly more balanced sample. Table 6 presents the age and gender demographics for the overall Algerian population (from the 2015 census), for the total Algerian Facebook population (from April 2019), and for our survey sample (April 2019). The table suggests that although Algerians on Facebook tend to skew younger and more male, our quotas slightly countered these biases. About 40% of our survey sample was female, compared to 36% of the overall Algerian Facebook population. About 74% of our sample were under 35, compared to 76% of the Facebook population.

Table 6: Representativeness of Algeria Survey Sample

	Census 2015		**Facebook Population**		**Survey Sample**	
Age	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
0-17	14.8	14.0	3.8	3.7	0	0
18-24	8.5	8.2	18.0	13.2	22.0	16.0
25-34	9.4	9.2	24.9	12.7	23.7	12.5
35-44	6.9	6.9	10.6	3.9	10.5	8.7
45-54	4.9	4.9	4.1	1.5	2.6	2.1
55-64	3.3	3.2	1.5	0.5	1.3	0.5
65+	2.9	3.0	1.1	0.5	0.01	0
Total	**50.6**	**49.4**	**64**	**36**	**60**	**40**

Table 7 provides summary statistics for all variables. While we do not have corresponding data for the Algerian population, it is likely that our sample skews more educated (63% claimed to have a university degree) and wealthier (35% claimed to make more than 60000 dinars – or $450 – a month).

1.4 Verification and Validation

We perform a series of checks to verify that respondents are indeed Algerians living in Algeria and taking the survey seriously. First, the geo-coordinates linked to IP addresses reveal the rough location of survey respondents (country and city, nothing that compromises anonymity). We filtered out the few respondents who took the survey outside of Algeria:

Second, Qualtrics prevents the same IP address from taking the survey more than once,

Table 7: Summary Statistics, All Variables

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Age	1,113	2.40	1.38	1	1	4	7
Female	1,113	0.40	0.49	0	0	1	1
Education	1,110	2.93	1.20	1.00	2.00	3.00	5.00
Income	1,065	3.22	2.09	1.00	2.00	4.00	10.00
Amazigh	1,113	0.13	0.34	0	0	0	1
Rural	1,113	0.14	0.35	0	0	0	1
Unemployed	1,113	0.23	0.42	0	0	0	1
Student	1,113	0.34	0.47	0	0	1	1
Have Protested	1,113	2.22	1.27	1	1	3	5
Supp Regime	1,088	1.82	1.07	1.00	1.00	3.00	5.00
Supp Military	1,099	3.85	1.10	1.00	3.00	5.00	5.00
Supp Gendarmerie	1,100	3.80	1.11	1.00	3.00	5.00	5.00
Supp Police	1,098	3.81	1.12	1.00	3.00	5.00	5.00
Supp Parli	1,091	1.83	1.04	1.00	1.00	3.00	5.00
Change System	1,111	4.03	0.93	1.00	3.00	5.00	5.00
Supp Democracy	1,105	3.42	1.20	1.00	3.00	4.00	5.00
Supp Sharia	1,097	3.59	1.16	1.00	3.00	5.00	5.00
Goal: 5th Term	1,113	0.41	0.49	0	0	1	1
Military ad	1,113	0.40	0.49	0	0	1	1
Post-Bouteflika	1,113	0.48	0.50	0	0	1	1
<u>Primes</u>							
Conscription	1,113	0.16	0.36	0	0	0	1
Corruption	1,113	0.17	0.37	0	0	0	1
Past Repression	1,113	0.17	0.37	0	0	0	1
Russia	1,113	0.16	0.37	0	0	0	1
United Nations	1,113	0.15	0.36	0	0	0	1
Conscription-Know Conscript	1,113	0.10	0.30	0	0	0	1
Conscription-Don't Know	1,113	0.06	0.23	0	0	0	1
<u>Post-Treatment</u>							
Will Protest	1,112	3.03	1.11	1.00	2.00	4.00	4.00
Military Will Repress	1,112	1.76	1.04	1.00	1.00	3.00	5.00
Soldiers Won't Shoot	1,109	4.55	0.85	1.00	4.00	5.00	5.00
Officers may, Soldiers won't	1,110	4.23	1.13	1.00	3.00	5.00	5.00
Fight Back	1,113	0.05	0.23	0	0	0	1
Military is Professional	1,112	0.69	0.46	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00



Figure 5: Map of Survey Respondents

and we can verify that there are no duplicate IP addresses. In addition, we can verify that there are no duplicate phone numbers. Both tests suggest that survey respondents did not attempt to take the survey multiple times to maximize phone credit.

Third, we can examine respondents' time to completion, to verify that respondents were taking the survey seriously, and were not zipping through the survey to receive phone credit. Our median time to completion was 24 minutes (see figure 6a), with only 4% completing the survey in less than 10 minutes.



Figure 6: Verification Checks: (a) Time to Completion and (b) Duplicates

Finally, following Kuriakose and Robbins (2016), we test for duplicate and near-duplicate surveys, which might indicate the same individual attempting to take the survey more than once. However, we had no perfect duplicates, and only 2% of the surveys were even 85% the same (figure 6b).[2]

[2]R code to detect duplicates obtained from https://github.com/andrewflowers/survey-fraud/blob/

1.5 Regression Analysis

We include the following control variables in our examination of the survey experiment. First, we control for a variety of demographic data thought to influence Algerians' willingness to protest, including their age, gender, level of education, income, ethnicity (Amazigh or Arab), urban/rural, unemployment, and whether they are a student. Second, we control for political variables that likewise influence whether they are likely to continue protesting, such as how often they have protested so far since the start of the *Hirak* protests on February 22, 2019, and their level of support for the regime, military, gendarmerie, police, and parliament. We likewise control for their political goals: how much they support a complete change of the political system, how much they support democracy, and how much they support shari'a.

We also include a political knowledge question to gauge whether they are even aware of the *Hirak* protests. In particular, we ask what the goals of the protesters have been, and record whether they correctly check at least the option "to protest Bouteflika's nomination for a 5th term." Finally, we include controls for which Facebook advertisement they were recruited through, and whether they took the survey before or after Bouteflika's resignation on April 2.

Table 8 presents the main table (the same as Table 2 in the text), now with the results of each covariate. Table 9 presents the Baron & Kenny mediation analysis, showing 1) that the effect of the conscription prime weakens when controlling for any of the three mechanism questions, and 2) that each mechanism question indeed shapes protest intentions. Table 10 then presents the Imai et al (2010) causal mediation analysis, showing a significant mediated effect using each mechanism. Finally, Table 11 shows the supplementary results: 1) that results are driven by those who personally know a conscript, and 2) that the conscription prime had no effect on either counter-explanation.

`master/r_scripts/percentmatch.R`.

Table 8: Algeria Survey Experiment: Main Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Will Protest	Military will repress	Soldiers won't shoot	Officers may, soldiers won't
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Primes				
Conscription	0.27*** (0.09)	−0.21** (0.10)	0.14* (0.08)	0.22* (0.12)
Corruption	0.12 (0.09)	−0.20** (0.10)	0.06 (0.08)	0.28** (0.11)
Past Repression	0.13 (0.09)	−0.15 (0.10)	−0.01 (0.08)	0.16 (0.11)
Russia	0.16* (0.09)	−0.14 (0.10)	−0.03 (0.08)	0.34*** (0.11)
United Nations	0.10 (0.10)	−0.05 (0.11)	0.13 (0.08)	0.15 (0.12)
Covariates				
Age	0.07** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Female	−0.06 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.15*** (0.06)	0.09 (0.08)
Education	0.01 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.03)
Income	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.001 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.02)
Amazigh	−0.07 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)	0.05 (0.07)	0.18* (0.10)
Urban	0.01 (0.08)	0.03 (0.09)	0.02 (0.07)	−0.04 (0.10)
Unemployed	0.11 (0.08)	0.18** (0.09)	0.04 (0.07)	0.14 (0.09)
Student	0.11 (0.09)	0.14 (0.10)	0.004 (0.08)	0.11 (0.11)
Have Protested	0.40*** (0.02)	−0.09*** (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Supp Regime	−0.22*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.04)	−0.09*** (0.03)	−0.14*** (0.04)
Supp Military	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.14*** (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	0.11* (0.06)
Supp Gendarmerie	0.01 (0.06)	−0.12** (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	−0.11 (0.07)
Supp Police	0.03 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.05)	0.10** (0.04)	0.12** (0.06)
Supp Parli	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.003 (0.04)	−0.06** (0.03)	−0.03 (0.04)
Change System	0.13*** (0.03)	−0.08** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.04)
Supp Democracy	0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Supp Sharia	0.003 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)
Goal: 5th Term	0.14** (0.06)	−0.10 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.07)
Military ad	−0.12* (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)	0.05 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.08)
Post-Bouteflika	−0.04 (0.06)	−0.13** (0.06)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.05 (0.07)
Constant	1.53*** (0.26)	3.33*** (0.29)	3.07*** (0.23)	3.18*** (0.32)
Observations	1,011	1,011	1,009	1,010
R^2	0.38	0.14	0.17	0.09
Adjusted R^2	0.36	0.12	0.15	0.06

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table 9: Baron & Kenny (1986) Mediation Analysis

	Dependent variable: Will Protest (1-4)			
	Baseline	Mechanism 1	Mechanism 2	Mechanism 3
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Primes				
Conscription	0.27*** (0.09)	0.23** (0.09)	0.25*** (0.09)	0.24*** (0.09)
Corruption	0.12 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	0.11 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)
Past Repression	0.13 (0.09)	0.11 (0.09)	0.14 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)
Russia	0.16* (0.09)	0.13 (0.09)	0.16* (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)
United Nations	0.10 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)
Mechanisms				
Military will repress		−0.16*** (0.03)		
Soldiers won't shoot			0.10*** (0.04)	
Officers may, soldiers won't				0.11*** (0.03)
Covariates				
Age	0.07** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)
Female	−0.06 (0.07)	−0.06 (0.06)	−0.07 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.07)
Education	0.01 (0.02)	−0.001 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Income	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Amazigh	−0.07 (0.08)	−0.05 (0.08)	−0.07 (0.08)	−0.08 (0.08)
Urban	0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	0.005 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)
Unemployed	0.11 (0.08)	0.14* (0.08)	0.10 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)
Student	0.11 (0.09)	0.14 (0.09)	0.11 (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)
Have Protested	0.40*** (0.02)	0.39*** (0.02)	0.40*** (0.02)	0.40*** (0.02)
Supp Regime	−0.22*** (0.03)	−0.21*** (0.03)	−0.21*** (0.03)	−0.21*** (0.03)
Supp Military	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.04 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.05)
Supp Gendarmerie	0.01 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.06)	0.003 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
Supp Police	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Supp Parli	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)
Change System	0.13*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)
Supp Democracy	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Supp Sharia	0.003 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.001 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Goal: 5th Term	0.14** (0.06)	0.13** (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)	0.13** (0.06)
Military ad	−0.12* (0.06)	−0.11* (0.06)	−0.12* (0.06)	−0.11* (0.06)
Post-Bouteflika	−0.04 (0.06)	−0.06 (0.06)	−0.05 (0.06)	−0.04 (0.06)
Constant	1.53*** (0.26)	2.07*** (0.28)	1.19*** (0.28)	1.17*** (0.27)
Observations	1,011	1,011	1,009	1,010
R^2	0.38	0.40	0.38	0.39
Adjusted R^2	0.36	0.38	0.36	0.37

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table 10: Causal Mediation Analysis (Imai et al 2010)

	Dependent variable: Will Protest		
	Mechanism 1	Mechanism 2	Mechanism 3
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Total Effect (conscription → protest)	0.264***	0.269***	0.269***
Mediated Effect (through exp. of repression)	0.036**	0.015*	0.024**
Direct Effect (not through exp. of repression)	0.228**	0.254***	0.246***
Proportion Mediated (through exp. of repression)	0.133**	0.050*	0.085**
Observations	1011	1009	1010

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table 11: Supplementary Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Will Protest	Military will repress	Fight back	Military is professional
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Primes				
Conscription: Know Conscript	0.30*** (0.11)	−0.29** (0.12)		
Conscription: Don't Know	0.16 (0.14)	−0.10 (0.15)		
Conscription			0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.05)
Corruption	0.11 (0.09)	−0.21** (0.10)	−0.005 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.05)
Past Repression	0.12 (0.09)	−0.16 (0.10)	−0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.05)
Russia	0.15 (0.09)	−0.15 (0.10)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.05)
United Nations	0.09 (0.10)	−0.06 (0.11)	0.01 (0.02)	0.09** (0.05)
Covariates				
Age	0.07** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)
Female	−0.06 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	−0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Education	0.01 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.002 (0.01)
Income	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.004 (0.004)	−0.01 (0.01)
Amazigh	−0.07 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.04)
Rural	0.01 (0.08)	0.03 (0.09)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.12*** (0.04)
Unemployed	0.10 (0.08)	0.18** (0.09)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)
Student	0.11 (0.09)	0.15 (0.10)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.04)
Have Protested	0.40*** (0.02)	−0.09*** (0.03)	−0.003 (0.01)	−0.004 (0.01)
Supp Regime	−0.22*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
Supp Military	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.14*** (0.05)	−0.02* (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)
Supp Gendarmerie	0.01 (0.06)	−0.12** (0.06)	0.02 (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)
Supp Police	0.03 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.05)	−0.03** (0.01)	0.06** (0.02)
Supp Parli	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.001 (0.02)
Change System	0.13*** (0.03)	−0.08** (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Supp Democracy	0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.01* (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)
Supp Sharia	0.003 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	−0.001 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Goal: 5th Term	0.14** (0.06)	−0.10 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)
Military ad	−0.12* (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	−0.04*** (0.02)	−0.01 (0.03)
Post-Bouteflika	−0.03 (0.06)	−0.14** (0.06)	−0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)
Constant	1.55*** (0.26)	3.33*** (0.29)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.20 (0.13)
Observations	1,011	1,011	1,011	1,011
R^2	0.38	0.14	0.05	0.15
Adjusted R^2	0.36	0.12	0.02	0.13

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

1.6 Survey Questionnaire

In addition to the survey experiment, we use the following questions in this paper (variable names in bold):

1. [**Female**] What is your gender?
2. [**Age**] What is your age?
3. [**Rural**] How would you describe the city or village you live in? (Urban, Suburban, Rural)
4. [**Unemployed, Student**] What is your current occupational status? (Employed, Unemployed, Student, Housewife, Retired)
5. [**Education**] What is your level of education? (Less than HS, HS, BA, MA, PhD)
6. [**Income**] What is the total monthly income for all members of your household?
7. [**Amazigh**] Which language is your mother tongue? (Arabic, Tamazight, French, Other)
8. [**Have protested**] Have you personally participated in any of the protests since February 22?
9. In your opinion, what have been the goals of the protests? Check all that apply.
    - [**Goal=5th term**] To protest Bouteflika's candidacy for a fifth term
10. Survey Experiment
11. [**Military Will Repress**] Suppose, hypothetically, that military personnel are ordered to repress the protesters. How likely would it be for the military to refuse to repress? [very unlikely to very likely]
12. [**Will Protest**] How likely are you to protest in the coming days? [Very unlikely to

very likely]

13. How much do you agree with the following statement?

    - [**Soldiers Won't Shoot**] Soldiers would not repress the protesters because they are brothers.

    - [**Officers may, Soldiers won't**] While officers may wish to preserve the system, soldiers will not fire on their countrymen.

14. [**Fight Back**] If the regime were to violently repress the protests, do you think the protesters should continue nonviolent protests, fight for their cause, or return home?

15. [**Military is Professional**] Do you think that most military personnel are professional? [Yes, No]

16. How much do you support the following institutions? (str. support to str. oppose)

    - [**Supp Regime**] The political system

    - [**Supp Military**] The military

    - [**Supp Gendarmerie**] The gendarmerie

    - [**Supp Police**] The police

    - [**Supp Parli**] The parliament

17. [**Change System**] Would you support a complete change of the political system? [strongly oppose to strongly support]

18. [**Supp Democracy**] Do you agree with the following statement? A democratic system may have its flaws, but it is better than other political systems (strongly agree to strongly disagree)

19. [**Supp Sharia**] Do you believe that the government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law (sharia)? [strongly disagree to strongly agree]

2 Cross-National Analysis

2.1 Control Variables

Table 12 lists the set of control variables used in all multivariate regression models presented in the main paper. The controls are grouped loosely by potential confounding factors, described at greater length below.

Table 12: Control Variables, Cross-National Analysis

Variable	Description	Source
War	Interstate war indicator	Reiter, Stam, & Horowitz (2016)
Rivalry	Rivalry indicator	Thompson & Dreyer (2012)
MilSize	Mil. personnel / total population (thousands)	COW NMC 5.0 (2017)
MilSpend	Mil. spending (thousands USD) / Mil. personnel	COW NMC 5.0 (2017)
Democracy	Regime is democratic	Magaloni, Chu & Min (2013)
MilRegime	Regime is autocratic + military-led	Magaloni, Chu & Min (2013)
BritCol	Former British colony indicator	Asal, Conrad, & Toronto (2017)
GDP	Logged per capita GDP, lagged	Combined, Penn World Tables (2017) & Maddison Project (2018)
GDPChange	GDP change from prior year	Combined, Penn World Tables (2017) & Maddison Project (2018)
PopSize	Logged total population, thousands	COW NMC 5.0 (2017)
Youth	Population % ages 15-24	World Development Indicators (2020)
Urban	Population % living in cities with > 100,000 residents	COW NMC 5.0 (2017)
Mobile	Mobile cell subscriptions per 100	World Development Indicators (2020)
Past Success	# of Past successful NV campaigns	NAVCO 2.1 (2019)
Past Defect	# of Past security force defections	NAVCO 2.1 (2019)
Diffusion	Other NVOnsets in region that year	NAVCO 2.1 (2019, hand-coded)
Region	Region Indicator	
Year	Year Fixed Effects	

The first set of controls regards state security. States at war or in security-scarce environments are more likely to conscript (Asal, Conrad and Toronto 2017), and any rally-around-

the-flag dynamics generated by external threats could depress the likelihood of anti-regime mobilization. To account for this variation, we include *War* and *Rivalry*, binary indicators of whether a state was engaged in an interstate war (Reiter, Stam and Horowitz 2016) or rivalry (Thompson and Dreyer 2012) in a given country-year.[3] We also include logged yearly measures of military personnel (*MilSize*) and military spending (*MilSpend*), proxies for states' security needs that could also influence opposition expectations for military repression, in line with the idea that regime patronage buys military loyalty (Bellin 2004).

The next group of controls pertains to regime type. Democracies conscript less than autocracies (Asal, Conrad and Toronto 2017), and also experience fewer regime change campaigns in the NAVCO dataset. Within autocracies, regimes led by military juntas are especially unstable and prone to civil unrest (Geddes 1999; Magaloni and Wallace 2008), and military leadership may also influence opposition expectations regarding the military's willingness to use force. We therefore include controls for *Democracy* and *MilRegime*, drawn from Magaloni, Chu and Min (2013).[4] Additionally, Asal, Conrad and Toronto (2017) find that British colonial origins decrease the likelihood of conscription, and these enduring colonial legacies may also influence civil society development, and in turn opposition behavior. We therefore control for *BritCol*, a binary indicator of whether a country was or had previously been a British colony, using the same measure as Asal, Conrad and Toronto (2017).

We also control for several economic factors. Economic development may discourage conscription, as volunteer systems better enable highly developed countries with advanced economies to capitalize on the efficient allocation of labor (as described by Asal, Conrad and Toronto 2017). At the same time, economic grievances may fuel opposition mobilization

[3]Thompson and Dreyer's original rivalries data is right-censored, stopping at 2010. However, interstate rivalries are highly stable over time—the vast majority of rivalries ongoing in 2010 had existed for decades prior, and continue to this day. Our analysis therefore extends the original rivalries data by assuming that a state's rivalry status in 2011-2013 matches its value in 2010. Censoring the analysis to 2010 and/or excluding the rivalries control produces similar results.

[4]While military crackdowns are uncommon in strong liberal democracies, repressive violence can occur in weak democracies or transitioning states, cases that are often of substantial import. For more on instances of so-called "murder in the middle," see (Davenport 2007, p. 11).

(Gurr 1970). We therefore control for logged per capita GDP lagged by one year (*GDP*) as well as yearly GDP change (*GDPChange*), to incorporate any effects of economic development or deprivation. Relatedly, conscription is more likely in populous countries, which can more easily spread the economic costs of conscription across a wider social base (Ross 1994; Mulligan and Shleifer 2005). As population size also correlates with nonviolent campaigns (large countries can more easily generate protests exceeding the 1000 person threshold), we include a logged measure of total population in thousands (*PopSize*).

Another known confounder involves demographic variation. States with aging populations are more likely to conscript, as older generations are incentivized to embrace the draft (which specifically burdens the youth) over the elevated taxes required to fund an volunteer army—especially if these older generations had already experienced conscription themselves (Poutvaara and Wagener 2007). Conversely, youth bulges, which can produce gluts of unemployed and disaffected young adults, are thought to increase the odds of civil conflict (Urdal 2006). We therefore control for *Youth*, the population percentage aged 15-24.

Our full models also include several controls drawn from the literature on protest mobilization.[5] We control for the population percentage living in urban areas (*Urban*) and logged mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people (*Mobile*), which proxy for the ease of opposition coordination and collective action (and may also proxy for drivers of mobilization associated with modernization theory). As mobilization is also generally thought to depend on the perceived efficacy of resistance, we also control for *PastSuccess* and *PastDefect*, which indicate whether either a successful nonviolent campaign or major security force defections have occurred in that country's past. As mobilization tends to occur in waves (Hale 2013), we also control for *Diffusion*, the logged number of nonviolent protest onsets in a state's region per year, along with a fixed-effects control for *Region*. Lastly, we control for year fixed effects, to help account for variation in the frequency and efficacy of nonviolent campaigns over time.

[5]On the causes of nonviolent mobilization, see Cunningham (2013); Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015).

2.2 Regression Tables and Robustness Checks

Table 13 provides full models for the main body Table 4.

Table 13: Campaign-Year Analysis, Full

	Dependent Variable		
	NV Campaign Size	Defection	NV Campaign Success
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conscript	0.689* (0.390)	0.137** (0.065)	0.138** (0.069)
War	0.057 (1.307)	0.452** (0.216)	0.057 (0.335)
Rivalry	−0.421 (0.397)	−0.092 (0.072)	−0.032 (0.068)
MilSize (log)	19.872 (36.552)	9.098 (7.779)	6.624 (6.901)
MilSpend (log)	0.606*** (0.229)	−0.032 (0.037)	−0.016 (0.042)
Democracy	−0.198 (0.402)	0.022 (0.082)	−0.042 (0.087)
MilRegime	−0.227 (0.424)	−0.040 (0.069)	−0.030 (0.068)
BritCol	0.169 (0.515)	0.113 (0.084)	−0.048 (0.084)
GDP (log)	0.234 (0.325)	−0.167*** (0.063)	−0.034 (0.066)
GDPChange	−0.093*** (0.028)	−0.019*** (0.007)	−0.012** (0.005)
PopSize	0.325** (0.134)	−0.023 (0.022)	−0.046** (0.022)
Youth	−4.520 (10.898)	−1.093 (1.715)	−3.316 (2.040)
Urban	1.200 (1.801)	0.091 (0.309)	0.037 (0.326)
Mobile (log)	−0.417 (0.373)	0.087 (0.078)	0.002 (0.077)
Diffusion (log)	−0.082 (0.252)	0.024 (0.047)	0.035 (0.045)
PastSuccess	0.028 (0.119)	−0.040* (0.023)	−0.036 (0.024)
PastDefection	−0.061 (0.077)	0.051*** (0.015)	0.031* (0.017)
Region(Americas)	1.294* (0.786)	0.112 (0.120)	0.046 (0.121)
Region(East Asia & Pacific)	0.660 (0.751)	−0.006 (0.127)	0.048 (0.134)
Region(Europe & Eurasia)	−0.113 (0.672)	0.129 (0.128)	−0.132 (0.122)
Region(Middle East & North Africa)	−0.578 (0.758)	0.170 (0.124)	−0.020 (0.140)
Region(South & Central Asia)	1.841** (0.754)	−0.069 (0.138)	0.413*** (0.155)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Constant	1.685 (3.569)	2.201*** (0.724)	1.712** (0.807)
Observations	316	330	338
R^2	0.390	0.319	0.241
Adjusted R^2	0.219	0.138	0.045

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust SEs computed via Huber-White sandwich estimator.

Table 14 provides full models for the main body Table 5.

Table 14: Nonviolent vs. Violent Tactics

	Dependent Variable	
	Vio Campaign Onset	Campaign Tactics
	(1)	(2)
Conscript	−0.002 (0.004)	0.060*** (0.022)
War	0.008 (0.013)	−0.045 (0.035)
Rivalry	−0.001 (0.004)	−0.092*** (0.023)
MilSize (log)	−0.069 (0.360)	3.645* (1.945)
MilSpend (log)	−0.0002 (0.002)	−0.053*** (0.013)
Democracy	−0.008** (0.004)	−0.145*** (0.030)
MilRegime	0.011* (0.006)	0.036 (0.025)
BritCol	0.010** (0.005)	0.005 (0.022)
GDP (log)	−0.009** (0.004)	0.103*** (0.017)
GDPChange	−0.002*** (0.0005)	−0.001 (0.001)
PopSize	0.003 (0.003)	0.063*** (0.016)
Youth	−0.143* (0.079)	−2.004*** (0.721)
Urban	0.021** (0.009)	0.069 (0.092)
Mobile (log)	0.002 (0.002)	0.018 (0.015)
Diffusion (log)	0.006 (0.004)	0.025 (0.021)
PastSuccess	0.009*** (0.003)	−0.008 (0.007)
PastDefection	0.0002 (0.001)	−0.024*** (0.003)
Region(Americas)	−0.007 (0.006)	0.097** (0.043)
Region(East Asia & Pacific)	−0.015** (0.007)	0.009 (0.034)
Region(Europe & Eurasia)	0.003 (0.007)	−0.089 (0.056)
Region(Middle East & North Africa)	0.008 (0.008)	−0.041 (0.050)
Region(South & Central Asia)	−0.001 (0.009)	0.005 (0.043)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Constant	0.133*** (0.041)	−0.250 (0.196)
Observations	7,244	2,018
R^2	0.039	0.208
Adjusted R^2	0.029	0.178

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust SEs computed via Huber-White sandwich estimator.

We perform two other robustness checks for our analysis of *NVOnset*, presented in Table 15. First, Model 1 adds additional controls for two other factors of interest: (1) *PhysInt*, the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, which captures the general severity of repression in a country; and (2) *ForeignSponsor*, which indicates whether autocratic states were client regimes of a foreign great power patron in that country year (drawn from Casey 2020). We exclude these controls from our primary analysis because they lack coverage for much of the period under study, and thus cut N drastically. That said, our main finding that conscription

increases the likelihood of nonviolent campaign onset holds with their inclusion.

Second, Model 2 makes a slight alteration to the dependent variable. Some countries see multiple nonviolent campaign onsets in the same year. To capture this variation, we re-run our analysis using the count of unique campaigns per country-year as the dependent variable (thereby condensing duplicated country-years into a single country-year observation). Again, the positive and significant association between conscription and nonviolent onset holds.

Table 15: NVOnset Robustness Checks

	Dependent Variable	
	NV Campaign Onset	NVOnset Count
	(1)	(2)
Conscript	0.011** (0.005)	0.010** (0.005)
War	−0.015** (0.006)	−0.017** (0.007)
Rivalry	−0.017*** (0.006)	−0.017*** (0.006)
MilSize (log)	−0.856* (0.461)	−0.465 (0.475)
MilSpend (log)	−0.008*** (0.003)	−0.008** (0.003)
Democracy	−0.020** (0.008)	−0.025*** (0.010)
MilRegime	0.014 (0.009)	0.009 (0.010)
BritCol	−0.001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)
GDP (log)	0.007* (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)
GDPChange	−0.001** (0.0004)	−0.001* (0.0004)
PopSize	0.002 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
Youth	−0.042 (0.135)	−0.114 (0.146)
Urban	0.018 (0.013)	0.010 (0.013)
Mobile (log)	0.004 (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
Diffusion (log)	0.0002 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)
PastSuccess	0.007** (0.003)	0.010** (0.004)
PastDefection	−0.002** (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.001)
ForeignSponsor	0.016 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)
PhysInt	−0.003 (0.002)	−0.003* (0.002)
Region(Americas)	0.007 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)
Region(East Asia & Pacific)	0.001 (0.008)	−0.003 (0.008)
Region(Europe & Eurasia)	−0.003 (0.012)	0.001 (0.012)
Region(Middle East & North Africa)	−0.001 (0.011)	−0.005 (0.010)
Region(South & Central Asia)	0.014 (0.012)	0.023 (0.016)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Constant	0.031 (0.050)	0.059 (0.057)
Observations	4,439	3,866
R^2	0.034	0.035
Adjusted R^2	0.022	0.021

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust SEs computed via Huber-White sandwich estimator.

2.3 Campaign Duration Analysis

One reviewer suggested that we examine the relationship between conscription and campaign duration. We view this relationship as theoretically indeterminate. On one hand, conscription might shorten nonviolent campaigns by enabling mass protests to succeed quickly. On the other hand, mass conscription may encourage nonviolent activists to persist in mobilization even after their initial attempts fail to elicit desired reforms, and it is common for nonviolent campaigns to take years to succeed. These competing effects make it difficult to know ex ante how conscription will influence campaign duration.

Table 16 presents the results of a survival analysis (cox proportional hazards model) assessing the relationship between conscription and the likelihood that an existing campaign will end, conditional on our standard battery of covariates (excluding year fixed effects, as this model lacks the necessary degrees of freedom). We find no clear effect of conscription on duration – conscription appears to be associated with an increased hazard for campaign termination, but the effect is far from significance.

Table 16: Surival Analysis

	coef	exp(coef)	se(coef)	z	Pr(>|z|)
Conscript	0.316	1.372	0.309	1.022	0.307
War	0.079	1.083	0.840	0.095	0.925
Rivalry	0.136	1.146	0.277	0.492	0.622
MilSize (log)	44.298	17.306e+19	22.336	1.983	0.047
MilSpend (log)	−0.395	0.674	0.157	−2.515	0.012
Democracy	0.367	1.444	0.328	1.119	0.263
MilRegime	−0.263	0.768	0.277	−0.952	0.341
BritCol	−0.361	0.697	0.376	−0.958	0.338
GDP (log)	0.179	1.196	0.254	0.705	0.481
GDPChange	−0.034	0.967	0.025	−1.346	0.178
PopSize	0.066	1.069	0.160	0.414	0.679
Youth	−6.238	0.002	7.139	−0.874	0.382
Urban	−0.980	0.375	1.208	−0.811	0.417
Mobile (log)	0.023	1.023	0.083	0.277	0.782
Diffusion (log)	0.110	1.116	0.178	0.618	0.537
PastSuccess	−0.317	0.728	0.150	−2.107	0.035
PastDefection	0.175	1.191	0.059	2.979	0.003
Region(Americas)	0.170	1.185	0.487	0.349	0.727
Region(East Asia + Pacific)	1.537	4.649	0.469	3.278	0.001
Region(Europe + Eurasia)	0.483	1.620	0.523	0.923	0.356
Region(Middle East + North Africa)	0.333	1.395	0.637	0.522	0.602
Region(South + Central Asia)	1.639	5.149	0.483	3.394	0.001

2.4 Toronto (2014) & NAVCO 2.1 Errata

In the processing of merging and reconciling data, we made several small changes and additions to the Toronto (2014) and NAVCO 2.1 data to incorporate civil resistance campaigns that were excluded during the merging process. We briefly describe those changes below:

- East Germany Worker Uprising (1953): Toronto (2014) does not consider East Germany a state in 1953, so we add the East Germany-1953 country-year to include this case. The case is ultimately excluded from our analysis because East Germany lacked its own standing army at this time, and the East German government largely relied on the Red Army for security.

- Yahya Family Revolt (1948): NAVCO 2.1 incorrectly uses the modern COW country code for Yemen for this time period (the 679 ccode designation applies post 1990), so we change the ccode designation to 678.

- Students Union Protests i.e. Revolution on Granite (1990): This major episode of nonviolent protest in Ukraine against Ukraine's communist government was initially dropped because Ukraine was not independent from the Soviet Union at this time, meaning that Toronto (2014) (and many other datasets that we use for control variables) do not contain Ukraine-1990 country-year data. We therefore shift the COW country code for the Students' Union Protests to 365 (Russia). Note that Russia and Ukraine both employ conscription during this time, as the Soviet Union mandated conscription in its satellite states.

- South Sudanese Civil War (2013): Toronto (2014) had no country-year data on the new state of South Sudan. We add relevant rows for South Sudan (2011-2013), but were unable to find clear evidence of conscription practices in Sudan during this time.

In addition, we also remedied several erroneous start and end campaign dates in NAVCO 2.1 that were producing negative campaign durations.

- 1987 Argentina Coup Plot: this campaign began on April 15, 1987, but the end date was erroneously listed as April 23, 1972. We changed the end date year to 1987 to reflect this.
- The Carnation Revolution start and end dates were reversed in NAVCO 2.1, and are corrected in our dataset.
- The 1950 Moluccans Uprising has an incorrect end date (the day and month were flipped) that is corrected in our analysis.

2.5 Coding Instructions, Toronto (2014) Expansion

Purpose: extend Toronto (2014)'s existing dataset on global conscription practices. The existing data is right-censored at 2008. We extend this data first through 2017.

Procedure: We replicate Toronto's original coding procedure as closely as possible, as described in his existing codebook. Below, we briefly detail the variables coded, and then describe the sources our RAs consulted in the coding process.

1. Recruit: this is the primary variable of interest. Recruit captures the means by which a state satisfies its military manpower requirements in a given year, either via conscription (0) or volunteerism (1). A few key notes from Toronto's original codebook:
   - Conscription = "as long as a non-trivial number of recruits are enlisted through force" (it need not be the majority).
   - "Force" includes "legal means (e.g., conscription) or extra-legal means (e.g., impressment), or where individuals cannot realistically say 'no' to military service."
   - Toronto generally assumes that service is voluntary, as source material usually states directly if conscription is in effect (often by listing the expected term of service). That said, as data on conscription is relatively thin, you may need to make educated guesses about some cases based on prior years.
2. Estimate: a dummy variable indicating whether you needed to make an educated guess about recruit (1 = you made a guess, 0 = it was clear).
3. Mil: did the state have a standing army in that year (1 if yes, 0 if no). Most will, but not all.
4. Tmenlist: the number of months for which recruits usually join (for both conscripted and volunteer units, if possible).

Sources: To collect 21st century conscription data, RAs consulted two primary sources:

1. International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1959-present. Military Balance. London, U.K. *Military Balance* includes yearly country and/or regional reports, which have quite detailed information about military practices, including conscription. We expect that most of the relevant data will be available in these reports.

2. CIA World Fact Book (here). After consulting *Military Balance*, the RA will check the short yearly country-pages provided in the CIA World Factbook, which often (but not always) contain information about conscription. The RA will default to the information provided in the Military Balance, but if no information about conscription is provided there, the RA will check the CIA World Factbook as a redundancy to avoid accidentally coding states that do employ conscription as volunteer.

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