

Supplementary Materials for:

What's in a Name? Experimental Evidence of the Coup Taboo

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1 Appendix A: Survey Methodology

We recruited 874 Tunisians, 2738 Egyptians, and 11,247 Algerians into our survey through advertisements on Facebook.¹ Each advertisement featured a picture of the country’s flag with a line inviting them to take an academic survey from Princeton University about politics in their country. For illustration, Figure 1 below shows the advertisement used for Algeria:



Figure 1: Facebook advertisement, Algeria

Clicking on the advertisement took users out of Facebook and into Qualtrics, a survey platform. Since the survey was conducted on Qualtrics, not Facebook, Facebook did not learn users’ answers to the survey or even if they took the survey at all. Once in Qualtrics, users could choose to take the survey in Arabic, French, or English. Over 93% chose to take the survey in Arabic, with the remainder in French. In the interests of transparency, a banner featuring the Princeton University Qualtrics logo headed every page.

On the first page (Figure 2), respondents answered two eligibility questions (age and nationality). We later verified that they were indeed living in Egypt, Tunisia, or Algeria using

¹Surveys approved through Princeton University IRB #10748 and #11581. All three surveys separately included targeted Facebook advertisements that oversampled the number of police and military personnel. For this paper, we exclude these respondents, leaving just the civilians in each country.

Figure 2: First page of Qualtrics survey



the geolocation of IP addresses (see Figure 3); we exclude any surveys completed outside of the intended country.




Figure 3: Map of Survey Respondents

After answering the eligibility questions, eligible users then proceeded to the consent form, which described all risks and benefits to the users. If they clicked agree, they could proceed to the survey itself, knowing they could terminate the survey at any time. Each survey featured about 80 questions, including demographics, attitudes towards the political system, and attitudes towards the military. The questionnaire featured randomization in question order as well as answer order.

Respondents appeared to take the survey seriously, and not zip through to the end. Figure 4 shows respondents' time to completion. In Egypt and Tunisia, our median time to completion was 21 minutes, with only 4% completing the survey in less than 10 minutes. In

Algeria as well, our median time to completion was 31 minutes, with less than 1% completing the survey in under 10 minutes.




Figure 4: Time to Completion

In Figure 5, we follow Kuriakose and Robbins (2016) and test for duplicate and near-duplicate surveys, which might indicate the same individual attempting to take the survey more than once. However, we had no perfect duplicates in any country. In Egypt and Tunisia, only 7% of the survey were even 85% the same. In Algeria, 12% of the surveys were over 85% the same.²




Figure 5: Testing for Duplicates

²R code to detect near-duplicates obtained from https://github.com/andrewflowers/survey-fraud/blob/master/r_scripts/percentmatch.R.

2 Appendix B: Demographics of Survey Sample

Table 1 presents demographic data on each of these survey samples. None of them are nationally-representative. After seeing the skew in Egypt and Tunisia, we implemented age and gender quotas during recruitment in Algeria, which brought that sample much closer to the general population. However, all samples still skew younger, more male, more urban, and better educated than the general population.

Table 1: Demographics by Country (%)

Demographic	Algeria (N=11,247)	Egypt (N=2,837)	Tunisia (N=874)
Age			
18-24	9	35	25
25-29	24	15	16
30-34	18	19	19
Female	47	7	18
Employed	38	35	49
Location			
Urban	66	51	63
Suburban	19	13	14
Rural	15	36	23
Education			
Less than H.S.	8	8	7
High School	31	27	17
B.A.	45	57	26
M.A.+	15	8	50
Religiosity			
Pray 5x per day	81	51	48
Several times per week	5	26	7
Less than once per week	11	21	31
Personally Know a Soldier	58	57	64
Support for Military	61	71	87
Support for Government/Sisi/Essebsi	8	50	15
Support for Democracy	61	44	40

3 Appendix C: Robustness Checks

Table 2: The Coup Taboo with Controls

	<i>Dependent Variable: Support for Military Intervention (%)</i>							
	Egypt		Tunisia		Algeria (no details)		Algeria (with details)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Coup Label	-52.90*** (1.45)	-55.93*** (1.67)	-24.78*** (3.16)	-27.24*** (4.05)	-31.01*** (0.68)	-31.49*** (0.71)	-14.33*** (1.00)	-13.43*** (1.02)
Age		5.32 (3.58)		11.19 (7.32)		2.88* (1.69)		11.11*** (2.43)
Female		3.01 (3.24)		-0.35 (5.28)		4.03*** (0.71)		4.16*** (1.02)
Rural		-1.09 (1.78)		-3.17 (4.95)		-1.89** (0.95)		-0.60 (1.37)
Employed		-2.24 (1.90)		-2.03 (4.41)		-1.59** (0.79)		-1.13 (1.13)
Education		-3.48 (3.61)		0.14 (6.71)		-5.78*** (2.08)		-3.21 (2.98)
Prayer		-3.42 (2.13)		-8.85* (4.65)		-0.44 (1.05)		-0.17 (1.50)
Know Military		5.96*** (1.71)		12.00*** (4.31)		2.72*** (0.70)		7.44*** (1.01)
Trust Military		11.61*** (3.17)		10.45 (8.92)		2.43** (1.24)		23.94*** (1.77)
Support President		-0.79 (2.66)		-20.32*** (7.24)		-8.27*** (1.27)		-24.95*** (1.82)
Support Democracy		-4.67* (2.56)		-8.88 (6.59)		-1.80 (1.23)		6.90*** (1.76)
Constant	59.48*** (1.04)	56.53*** (3.71)	48.46*** (2.18)	45.75*** (10.60)	36.37*** (0.55)	38.48*** (2.06)	60.87*** (0.59)	37.66*** (2.86)
Observations	2,837	2,043	874	499	10,695	10,019	10,701	10,019
R ²	0.32	0.37	0.07	0.13	0.16	0.17	0.02	0.06
Adjusted R ²	0.32	0.37	0.06	0.11	0.16	0.17	0.02	0.06

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Note: For Algeria, these results represent the between-subjects design.

Table 3: Coup Taboo by various subsets (Egypt & Tunisia)

Subset	Egypt			Tunisia		
	Coup	Remove	Difference	Coup	Remove	Difference
Full Sample	7	60	53***	24	49	25***
Age 45+	4	65	61***	31	47	16**
Female	9	59	50***	12	56	43***
Rural	6	60	54***	16	52	36***
Employed	5	59	54***	31	44	13***
Less than BA	9	61	52***	17	58	41***
Support Democracy	7	54	47***	21	39	18***

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Coup Taboo by various subsets (Algeria)

Subset	Algeria (no details)			Algeria (with details)		
	Coup	Remove	Difference	Coup	Remove	Difference
Full Sample	6	36	30***	47	62	15***
Age 45+	7	36	29***	51	66	15**
Female	7	39	32***	45	63	18***
Rural	7	34	27***	46	62	16***
Employed	6	33	27***	48	64	16***
Less than BA	7	40	33***	49	62	13***
Support Democracy	6	37	31***	49	67	18***

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5 presents the within-subject results in Algeria. Respondents there saw 2 out of the 4 possible options, with the 6 possible combinations shown in the left column. The two clean combinations, which allow us to tease out the coup taboo and thus are mentioned in the manuscript, appear in bold.

What the combinations reveal is that the coup label produces about a 20-27 point penalty (first two combinations). Meanwhile, mentioning that the president is corrupt and undermining national security produces a 31-38 point gain (middle two combinations). Accordingly, combining them produces a 55 point spread (fifth combination): only 5% supported a coup but 60% supported removing a corrupt president (a similar magnitude as Egypt’s). Finally, combining them at cross-purposes highlights that the gains from labelling a president corrupt are greater than the costs of labelling an intervention a coup: respondents were slightly more supportive of a coup against a corrupt president than removing a president (47 v. 36).

Table 5: Full within-subjects results (Algeria)

Which two respondents saw	Option 1	Option 2	Difference
Coup v. Remove	10	37	27***
Coup Corrupt v. Remove Corrupt	46	66	20***
Coup v. Coup Corrupt	10	48	38***
Remove v. Remove Corrupt	35	66	31***
Coup v. Remove Corrupt	5	60	55***
Coup Corrupt v. Remove	47	36	-11***

*Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$*

These results also show that respondents’ level of support for a particular option did not vary much by which other option they saw. Support for a coup was low (5, 10, and 10%) regardless of which of the other three options they were shown. Very consistent results also obtain for removing a president (35, 36, 37%), for removing a corrupt president (60, 66, 66%), and for staging a coup against a corrupt president (46, 47, 48%).

4 Appendix D: Survey Questionnaire

The following survey questions were used in this paper:

1. What is your age?
2. What is your nationality?
3. What is your gender?
4. How would you describe the city or village in which you grew up?
 - Urban, Suburban, Rural
5. Are you currently employed?
6. What is your level of education?
 - Less than high school, high school graduate, Bachelor's degree, Graduate degree
7. How often do you pray?
 - Once a week, 2-3 times a week, at least once a day, five times a day
8. Do you personally know anyone with military experience (friend or family)?
9. How much trust do you have in the following institutions?
 - (a) The government
 - (b) The military
10. Please indicate your level of support for the following individuals on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lowest level of support and 5 indicates the highest level of support.
 - (a) Abdelfattah al-Sisi [Egypt]
 - (b) Beji Caid Essebsi [Tunisia]

11. Suppose there was a scale from 1-5 measuring the extent to which democracy is suitable for your country, with 1 meaning that democracy is absolutely inappropriate, and 5 meaning democracy is absolutely appropriate. To what extent do you think democracy is suitable for your country? [Egypt and Tunisia only]
12. Do you agree with the following statement: "A democratic system may have its flaws, but it is better than other political systems." [strongly disagree to strongly agree; Algeria only]
13. How appropriate would it be for someone in the military to perform the following actions? Please answer on a 1-5 scale, where 1 means very inappropriate and 5 means very appropriate. [Randomized: in Egypt and Tunisia, respondents saw 1 of the 2 options; in Algeria, respondents saw 2 of the 4 options]
 - (a) Stage a coup against the president
 - (b) Remove the president [Algeria only]
 - (c) Stage a coup against a corrupt president who is undermining the country's security [Algeria only]
 - (d) Remove a corrupt president who is undermining the country's security